The  Duty  To Be a Rational Shareholder by Hoffman, David A
THE "DUTY" TO BE A RATIONAL SHAREHOLDER
David A. Hoffman†
"[I]n evaluating disclosure, as we must here, we continue to assume rationality 
and that all participants approach the situation thinking as Economic Man, within 
Adam Smith's definition, seeking to follow the lead of Smith's ‘Invisible Hand.’"
Chock Full O’Nuts Corp. v. Finkelstein, 548 F. Supp. 212, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(Brieant, J.)
American public shareholders are uniquely blessed by the freedom to do what
they will with their capital.  Unlike other stakeholders, shareholders owe the corporation 
no legal duties.1  Shareholders provide cash, and, in exchange, receive management’s 
fiduciary fealty and limited voting and distribution rights.2  This framework respects the 
difficulties that shareholders face in contracting to protect their rights, and is 
conventionally summarized by a simple moral: "The only promise that makes sense in 
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1 See FLETCHER CYC CORP. § 5713 (Perm. Ed. 2000) ("Ordinarily, at least unless the shareholder is a 
majority shareholder or active in the management of the corporation, he has no well-defined duties.") 
(internal footnotes omitted); Paula J. Dalley, The Misguided Doctrine of Stockholder Fiduciary Duties, 33 
HOF. L. REV. 175, 206-11 (2004) (discussing basic corporate law framework of shareholder rights and 
duties); see also Chiarella v. United States, 446 U.S. 222, 229 (1980) (purchasers of stock owe no duties to 
corporations or potential shareholders); cf. JAMES D. COX & THOMAS L. HAZEN, CORPORATIONS § 
11.11(2nd Ed. 2003) (duties of majority shareholders); id. at § 10.1-10.19 (directors' and officers' duties of 
care and loyalty).
There are two minor exceptions to the no duty rule, apart from the major one identified in this article.  
First, shareholders wishing to file derivative actions have a duty first to make a demand on the board.  See
generally COX & HAZEN, supra, § 15.04. 
Second, the statute of limitations may be seen as a duty to inquire about the underlying facts of a securities 
claim.  See, e.g., Newman v. Warnaco Group, Inc., 335 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2003).
2 See Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law 
as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 623 (2002).
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such an open-ended relation is [for management] to work hard and honestly."3  Indeed, 
the absence of bilateral duties is the unstated assumption and organizing principle of 
every discussion of corporate governance.4
Or so the story goes.  In reality, courts require individual investors to investigate 
their purchases, to coldly process risk, to disregard oral statements of optimism, and 
generally to be economically rational investors.  If investors fail to meet these
expectations, judges deny them the protection of the securities laws.  In this way, courts 
impose on public securities investors a special kind of legal duty, novel in scope and, I 
will argue, ungrounded in principle.
Surprisingly, although the makings of this duty have been present for almost 
thirty years, no study to date has considered the sheer scope of rationality’s burden: 
courts require investors to act in ways that ordinary citizens do not, if they are to receive 
a government benefit – protection from fraud – nominally available to all.5 Nor have 
commentators addressed the demographic and redistributive consequences of judicially 
3 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK AND DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 91 
(1991) (articulating the dominant economic view of corporate governance) (emphasis added).
4
 We may know this to be true by conducting a thought experiment.  Imagine that when you buy a share of 
stock, the law imposed a duty of loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders.   You proceed to hedge 
your investment, choosing (foolishly) to short your own stock instead of a competitor's.  The stock price 
falls.  You decide to liquidate both positions, making a modest profit.  Would the corporation, or your 
fellow shareholders, sue you for breach of the duty you owe them?  Yes, as corporations would look like 
partnerships; under such circumstances, your liability would be limited only by your fealty and assets. 
5
 Bainbridge and Gulati's recent work is the first, to my knowledge, that begins the task of a controlled 
empirical investigation of the materiality doctrine.  See Stephen M. Bainbridge and G. Mitu Gulati, How do 
Judges Maximize? (The Same Way Everybody Else Does – Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud 
Opinions, 51 EMORY L. J. 83, 116 n.94 (2002); cf. Donald C. Langevoort, Review Essay, Are Judges 
Motivated to Create "Good" Securities Fraud Doctrine?  51 EMORY L. J. 309 (2002) (commenting on 
Bainbridge and Gulati's study).  Unlike the present study, Bainbridge and Gulati do not analyze the rates at 
which courts apply the various immateriality techniques in the caselaw, relying instead on a behavioral 
explanation for why such techniques might be effective or attractive.  Quantitative caselaw analysis of 
disclosure outside of the securities fraud context is just beginning, but has already produced one 
particularly interesting analysis of common law disclosure duties.  See Kimberly D. Krawiec & Kathryn
Zeiler, Common Law Disclosure Duties and the Sin of Omission: Testing the Meta-theories, UNC Leg. 
Stud. Research Paper No. 04-4, available at http:sssrn.com/abstract=614501 (analyzing 466 decisions, and 
testing results against the conventional theories explaining when disclosure is required).
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privileging certain classes of investors, or the collateral effects of imposing new investor 
duties on the mainstream of corporate law.  This article takes up these topics.
To recover under securities laws, such as the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934,6
private plaintiffs, or the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")7 must prove by a 
substantial likelihood that a suspect corporate disclosure omitted (or misrepresented) 
material facts,8 i.e., facts that a "reasonable investor" would have considered significant.9
But who and what is a "reasonable investor"?10  In tort and contract law, "reasonableness"
has a subjective and an objective component: reasonable people act in ways that meet 
societal expectations, while remaining true to a subjective understanding of legal duties 
and rights.11 The securities law standard is similar,12 but courts choose an entirely
objective approach.13
6 See LOUIS LOSS AND JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION IV 2074-75 (3d ed. 
2000) (materiality precedent interchangeable in federal securities laws). 
7 See Yvonne Ching Ling Lee, The Elusive Concept of "Materiality" Under the U.S. Federal Securities 
Laws, 40 WILL. L. REV. 661, 663 (2004) (application of standard by SEC).  The SEC rewords the 
traditional caselaw standard in its enforcement directions, to define a reasonable investor as one who 
"generally focuses on matters that have affected, or will affect, a company's profitability and financial 
out look."  Memorandum from David B.H. Martin, Director, Division of Corporation Finance, SEC, to 
Laura Unger, Acting Chair, SEC, at 2 (May 8, 2001) (describing the longstanding SEC position).
8 See LOSS AND SELIGMAN, supra n. 6, at 2071.
9 TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); see also Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 
U.S. 224, 232 (1988) ("expressly adopt[ing] the TSC Industries standard of materiality for the 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 context").
10
 As some have observed, both "reasonable" and "investor" have multiple variants: rational, prudent, 
informed, lay and typical; shareholder, stockholder, businessman, man and person.  Richard L. Epling and 
Terence W. Thompson, Securities Disclosure in Bankruptcy, 39 BUS. LAW. 855, 891-93 (1984).  
11 See ALLAN E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, §§  7.9, 7.10 (4th Ed. Aspen Publishers, 2004); DAN B. 
DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, §§  117, 118 (West Group, 2000); see also Piambino v. Bailey, 610 F.2d 
1306, 1320 (5th Cir. 1980) (analogizing reasonable investor to reasonable person standard in tort cases).
12 Basic, 485 U.S. at 232.   The "elusiveness" of the materiality standard creates an enormous degree of 
frustration among practitioners, and some academics.  See Lee, supra n. 7, at 675-76; Joan MacLeon 
Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of Insider Trading: A Call for Action, 2003 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1131, 1148-1168 (analogizing materiality standard to the Hogwort's sorting hat, and arguing that 
ambiguity in the standard creates problems for lawyers and clients in evaluating risk and benefits of 
disclosure). 
13 See generally Epling and Thompson, supra n. 10, at 894-5; Lee, supra n. 7, at 664.  There are alternative 
stories.  For example, Bainbridge and Gulati describe the emergence of presumed immateriality doctrine as 
a method for judges to quickly and easily deal with constraints on their time and resources. See Bainbridge 
and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 113-131; cf. Langevoort, supra n. 5, at 316-18 (concluding that a rapid embrace 
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Adjudicating securities cases under the "reasonable investor" standard, courts 
soon confronted a dissonance between what forces they believed would move m arkets 
(i.e., disclosure of information affecting a firm’s finances) and the relatively trivial 
disclosures that plaintiffs had claimed created market effects.14 To resolve this tension,
courts developed the doctrine of immateriality as a matter of law.15 Applying this
doctrine, courts began to dismiss plaintiffs’ allegations that a corporation had made false 
or misleading disclosures because judges presumed a reasonable shareholder would have 
ignored the fraud. Immateriality as a matter of law is thus best seen as "presumed 
immateriality."  It is the scope and nature of presumed immateriality that creates the duty 
to be a rational shareholder.
Conventional wisdom holds that courts rarely make findings of presumed 
immateriality.  Courts say they are applying a standard that is self-consciously limited: 
the materiality judgment "requires delicate assessments of the inferences a reasonable 
shareholder would draw . . . and these assessments are peculiarly ones for the trier of 
fact."16 Similarly, scholars, although applauding the courts’ applications of presumptive 
immateriality,17 conclude that materiality issues in securities cases are almost always left 
of the anti-rationality defenses represents "a shift in the ideology of the judiciary leading to a pro-defendant 
bias.")  I comment on these stories infra at Part IV.
14
 Courts have rejected a truly objective, quantitative test, which would make market reaction necessary and 
sufficient to find materiality.  See Lee, supra n. 7, at 664; but cf. Elkind v. Liggest & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 
156, 166 (2d Cir. 1980) (discussing market reaction as relevant to materiality determination).
15 See LOSS & SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS, supra n. 6, at 2082-2105.  Similarly, some disclosed 
information is presumptively material.  See Note, Should the SEC Expand Nonfinancial Disclosure 
Requirements?, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1433 (2002) (fact of business operations in a foreign company under 
government sanction likely to be treated as material per se).
16 TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 450.  The Court elsewhere rejected a less stringent standard, stating that 
materiality was not merely something a "reasonable shareholder might consider important.  Id. at 446.
17 See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Nowicki, A Response to Professor John Coffee: Analyst Liability Under Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1305, 1325 (2004) (noting with approval 
a Second Circuit case upholding a finding of presumed immateriality so as to prevent disclosure of an 
"avalanche of trivial information.")
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for jury resolution.18  Only very recently have some academics begun to question this 
conventional account.19
In this paper, I demonstrate empirically that courts dismiss claims by presuming 
immateriality in half of opinions considering materiality.20  This is a surprising, and 
significant, finding.  Presumed immateriality’s magnitude means that the doctrine 
channels a large set of claims and plaintiffs out of the securities fraud system; the 
mechanism of this channeling is a judicially created set of commitments and assumptions 
regarding how reasonable investors act.  That is, presumed immateriality reflects a kind 
of judicial ideology concerning which investors are entitled to protection from securities 
fraud and which are not.
To understand this ideological choice, my empirical analysis turned to presumed 
immateriality’s rationales.  This paper shows that courts implicitly (and, as in Chock Full 
O’Nuts, sometimes explicitly) treat economic rationality as a synonym for 
18 See, e.g., Paul Vizcarrondo et al., Liability Under Sections 11, 12, 15 and 17 of the Securities Act of 1933 
and Sections 10, 18 and 20 of the Securities Act of 1934, 1443 PLI/CORP 1049, 1060 (2004) ("[Q]uestions 
of materiality are usually for the jury to decide . . ."); Epling and Thompson, supra n. 10, at 895
("Accordingly, the inference of such an investor's actions is the responsibility of the trier of fact and 
normally is not susceptible to resolution on summary judgment."); Heminway, supra n. 12, at 1183 (linking 
the "ill-defined standard" to difficulty in resolving cases pre-trial); Terry Fleming, Perspectives on Business 
Law: Telling the Truth Slant – Defending Insider Trading Claims Against Legal and Financial Professions, 
28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1421, 1430 (2002) ("Motions for judgment on the pleadings and summary 
judgment are rarely granted"); Edward A. Fallone, Section 10(b) and the Vagaries of Federal Common 
Law: The Merits of Codifying the Private Cause of Action Under a Structuralist Approach, 1997 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 71, 100; Robert A. Rosenfeld and Clyde J. Wadsowrth, Materiality After Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 378 
PLI/LIT 275, 290 (1989) (questioning viability of summary judgment on materiality issues following 
Basic).  
19
 Bainbridge and Gulati, analyzing a set of 100 randomly selected securities cases, note briefly that 91 
were decided at the motion to dismiss stage, and over 70 percent of those involved materiality 
determinations in favor of defendants.  See Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 116, n.94; cf. COX AND
HAZEN, supra n. 1, at 296 (presumed immateriality determinations arise "with some regularity"); Donald C. 
Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe's Shadow: the SEC's Pursuit of Managerial Accountability, 79 
WASH.  U. L.Q. 449, 479-80 (2001) (noting the "stunning willingness of judges to decide difficult 
materiality issues 'as a matter of law'").
20
 This finding applies to private plaintiff suits only.  Overall, the blended rate is slightly less than 50%.  
See infra Part II.
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reasonableness, and irrationality as a synonym for unreasonableness.21 This ideological 
decision fundamentally misconceives how shareholders actually respond to information.
Shareholders’ behavior deviates from economic rationality in both predictable and 
unpredictable ways; individuals "suffer" from a variety of cognitive biases, heuristics, 
and social norms.  In law, these deviations from rational expectations have been 
described by a growing literature adapted from behavioral economics.22  Part I of this 
article reviews recent behavioralism literature, with a special focus on the experimental 
results with which behavioralists have undermined traditional assumptions of shareholder 
rationality.
Part II analyzes 471 federal securities cases from the Second Circuit and its 
district courts to demonstrate those courts’ willingness to require shareholders to act like
economically rational actors, a fictional legal construct. As a part of my analysis, I ask 
three crucial questions: (1) what is the scope of the "presumed immateriality" doctrine?; 
(2) how has it changed over time?; (3) does party identity matter in determining if a 
disclosure is immaterial as a matter of law?  These questions are significant to 
21 See infra Part III.  Others have suggested that judges ought to correct for human irrationality through the 
common law.  For example, Choi and Pritchard describe a model of "intermediate scrutiny" for judges' 
attempts to modulate investor irrationality through the common law.  Stephen Choi and Adam Pritchard, 
Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 47-50 (2003).  Choi and Pritchard argue that 
courts, unlike regulators, are subject to market-like constraints on their ability and have already created a 
standard – materiality, that "reflect[s] the cognitive limitations facing investors."  Id. at 48.  However, Choi 
and Pritchard caution that courts may face their own biases, may be temped to shunt cases from their 
dockets by creating bright line rules, and may unthinkingly follow foolish precedent.  Id. at 50. 
22 The corpus of behavioral law and economics literature is vast and still spawning.  Traditional accounts 
situate its origin in the work of Robert Ellickson and Herbert Hovenkamp.  See Robert C. Ellickson, 
Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 
CHI-KENT L. REV. 23 (1989); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 N.Y. 
U. L. REV. 4, 76 (1994).  A good place to begin looking at the scholarship is the anthology BEHAVIORAL 
LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein, ed., 2000).
Recent work also includes an important piece about the malleability of decision making: Jon D. Hanson 
and Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously (I): The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999).
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understanding what courts are actually doing and why they are doing it, and mine is the 
first study to consider the answers in a systematic way.23
Part III discusses how courts’ presumptions about reasonable investor behavior 
(manifest in the reasons they give for findings of immateriality) are in tension with the 
findings of social science research on human decision making (described in Part I).  In 
particular, I focus on how courts’ justifications for presumed immateriality have moved 
from fact-intensive investigations to bright-line tests based on the language contained in 
disclosures.  
In Part IV, I build on my empirical analysis by describing how the presumed 
immateriality doctrine creates a common-law "duty of rationality."24 I make predictions 
about the market effects of the duty of rationality, which (if true) would suggest that the 
application of the securities laws may have deep, and potentially unintended
redistributive and demographic effects: they may be driving individual investors to 
mutual funds and redistributing wealth away from minorities and women towards white 
men.25
23
 In the last few years, there have been several important empirical investigations of securities fraud cases.  
Mitu Gulati, Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi and Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud by Hindsight , 98 N.W. U. L. REV. 773, 
803-804 (2004) (analyzing a database of cases discussing the "fraud by hindsight" doctrine);  Bainbridge 
and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 88, n.12 (analyzing 100 randomly selected cases from 1996 through 2001, and 
reaching certain limited conclusions regarding plaintiff success rate in materiality analyses); Hillary A. 
Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903 (2002) (describing change in percentages of 
complaints surviving dismissal post-PLSRA as arising from judicial heuristics); Theresa A. Gabaldon, A 
Sense of Security: An Empirical Study, 25 J. CORP. L. 307 (2000) (analyzing courts' treatment of the term 
"security").  This empirical work in part, confirms intuitions that some scholars had about the ways the 
securities laws were being applied.  See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken 
Inferences by Investors and Others, 52 STAN. L. REV. 87, 90 n.16 (1999) (impressions of the effects of 
procedure on securities law). 
24
 As far as I can tell, I am the first to suggest that this duty positively accounts for some securities fraud 
doctrines.  However, Donald Langevoort's commentary on prior empirical investigations questioned 
whether judges were projecting their own ideal of how they would act as investors – "prone to self-
attributions that overweight the level of caution and skepticism that they bring to their decisionmaking and 
thus to their construal of reasonableness – to their decisions as adjudicators."  See Langevoort, Are Judges 
Motivated, supra n. 5, at 317-18.  
25 See infra at text accompanying notes 261 through 270.
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At its heart, when its scope is appreciated, presumed immateriality begins to look 
like a product of the courts’ struggle to control the behavior of two very different kinds of 
participants in the system of securities regulation: investor-plaintiffs, and juries.  
Presumed immateriality, because it assumes – contrary to real world evidence – that 
investors act rationally, removes power from juries and transfers it to judges, while 
imposing formidable cognitive burdens on investors seeking to be protected from fraud.  
The entire construct (courts’ presumptions, the scope of immateriality, and a resulting 
investor duty to be rational) seems in turn to be based on the courts’ need to harmonize 
securities law with the foundational assumption of corporate law: that all parties to the 
corporate form act rationally.  It is to this assumption, and the evidence that undermines 
it, that I now turn.
Part I: Behavioral Analysis of Public Shareholders
Traditionally, hornbook law and academic literature described common 
shareholders as rational actors,26 and the assumption remains implicit "in the minds of all 
concerned with doing business under the corporate form."27 Rational shareholders are 
"able to anticipate and consider all relevant factors in making choices and … they have 
unlimited computational capacities."28
Rational shareholders know what they want and select it in the most efficient way 
available.29 Rational shareholders do not speculate (unless the risk/benefit calculation 
26
 Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate Democracy, 23 GA. L. 
REV. 97, 178 (1988); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and its Consequences 
for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417, 418 (2003); Chock Full O'Nuts, 548 F. Supp. at 219.
27
 Ryan, supra n. 26, at 178.
28
 Paredes, supra n. 26, at 434.
29 See Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 
1551 (1998) (analogizing rational persons to rats which "are at least as rational as human beings when 
rationality is defined as achieving one's ends . . . at least cost").  Another way of describing the expected 
utility theory is to note its four principal decisionmaking principles:  ordering (people "must prefer one 
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justifies speculation).  They avoid market panics and calmly accept stock appreciation.30
They do not buy stocks based on internet rumors.31  Rational investors have one purpose
in choosing what to do with their investments: make more money.32
Because rational shareholders make such predictable and good decisions, the 
rational shareholder model supports a powerful economically based critique of securities 
regulation. Some legal economists believe that shareholders should be permitted to 
accept contracts that opt out of the disclosure and fraud regime created by federal 
securities laws – so-called "contractarians."33 Contractarians argue that investors should 
be permitted to contract away their rights to protection against fraud, although courts 
might protect particularly inexperienced investors.34  Contractarian theory has found a 
[object to another] or be indifferent to both"); continuity ("if the odds are right, a person will always 
gamble"); independence ("A person's preferences between two objects should remain unchanged when the 
objects are substituted into identical lotteries"); and invariance (individuals should express the same 
preferences when different descriptions of the same outcome are presented). See Hanson and Kysar, supra
n. 22 , at 642.
30 Cf. ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (Princeton 2000) (arguing that individuals irrationally 
participated in the late-1990s market bubble).
31
 Robert Prentice, Contract-Based Defenses in Securities Fraud Litigation: A Behavioral Analysis, 2003 
U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 369-71 (discussing case of a New Jersey teenager subject to a SEC enforcement action 
because of his postings on internet chat-boards).
32
 The most common thick version of the rational choice theory is wealth-maximization, which predicts that 
individuals will act to maximize they amount of money they have.  Russell B. Korobkin and Thomas S. 
Ulen, Law and Behavioral Sciences: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 
CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1066 (2000).
33
 Contractarianism also describes these scholars' view of the nature of corporate law generally.  That is, 
contractarians believe that all players in the market for corporate control (i.e. shareholders, managers, 
directors, employees, etc.) should determine their mutual duties via contract law.  See generally Stephen 
Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CAL. L. REV. 279 (2002) (arguing 
for deregulation of securities in favor of market based disclosure system); A. C. Pritchard, Markets as 
Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. 
REV. 925 (1999) (proposing that exchanges self-regulate); Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 
83 VA. L. REV. 14553 (1997); Larry E. Ribenstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: 
A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 U. IOWA J. CORP. L. 1, 47-61 (2002) (defending market 
and contractual approaches after considering insights from BLE literature); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, 
supra n. 3; Prentice, supra n. 31, at 344-350 (discussing contractarian scholarship and caselaw).
34 Compare Choi, Regulating Investors, supra n. 33, at 284-326 with Robert A. Prentice, Whither Securities 
Regulation?  Some Behavioral Observations Regarding Proposals For Its Future,  51 Duke L.J. 1387, 
1489-90 (2002) (criticizing Choi's proposal as unrealistic and based on flawed assumptions).
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fertile reception with some judges.35  For example, in Carr v. Cigna Securities, Inc., 
Judge Richard Posner denied the securities fraud claims of an unsophisticated investor 
who had been told orally that certain investments were safe and conservative, but had 
received written warnings detailing their high risk.36  Posner reasoned that written 
warnings should, as a matter of law, preclude the possibility of recovery based on oral 
falsehoods.37
Behavioral law and economics ("BLE") undermines the contractarian thesis by 
using data from psychology experiments to radically alter our view of how humans make 
choices.38  BLE documents how individuals’ choice-making behavior systematically 
diverges from the predictions of the rational-actor model of human behavior.
A second component of BLE research aims to develop and defend a theory of 
"bounded self interest."39  Bounded self-interest theory attempts to explain the 
attractiveness of norms of fairness, sharing, reciprocity, and altruism in ways distinct 
from those traditionally relied on by economists.  
35 See Douglas M. Branson, Running the Gauntlet: A Description of the Arduous, and Now Often Fatal, 
Journey for Plaintiffs in Federal Securities Law Actions, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 3, 23 (1996) ("[C]ontract 
reigns uber alles…")
36
 95 F.3d 544 (7th Cif. 1996).
37 Id.  See also Prentice, supra n. 31, at 345-6.
38 See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS supra n. 22 (collecting essays); Kent Greenfield and 
Peter C. Kostant, An Experimental Test of Fairness Under Agency and Profit-Maximization Constraints 
(With Notes on Implications For Corporate Governance), 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 983, 984-85 (2003) 
(introducing experimental study aimed at undermining the traditional law and economic view of the value 
of the profit-maximization norm); Jennifer Arlen et al., Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency 
Relationships, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2-5 (2002) (discussing effect on BLE on received wisdom of corporate 
law scholarship); David A. Hoffman and Michael P. O'Shea, Can Law and Economics Be Both Practical 
and Principled, 53 ALA. L. REV. 335, 360-63 (2002) (describing how behavioral literature undermined 
classical law and economist normative research); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A 
Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1058-59 (2000) ("For corporate and securities law scholars, 
behavioral economics probably is the most exciting intellectual development of the last decade."); cf. Lynn 
A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. LAW 
636 (2003) (discussion BLE implications for the efficient capital markets hypothesis).
39 See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra n. 22, at 16.
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BLE is a controversial discipline that has created an ever-expanding literature 
debating its political40 and methodological roots.41  And, because I situate my scholarship 
firmly within the BLE "camp," I am troubled by the perception that BLE research has
been manipulated to serve the ends of certain private entities.42
40
 BLE has traditionally been seen as a politically "liberal" movement because it emboldens the use of 
government intervention to solve legal policy choices.  See Philip E. Tetlock & Barbara A. Mellers, The 
Great Rationality Debate, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI. 94, 97 (2002) (economists "on the left" are more likely to 
embrace BLE than economists "on the right");  Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure, supra n. 38, at 1027 
("[I]t seems probable that behavioral economics increasingly will be invoked by those who favor 
government intervention precisely because behavioral economics offers a new line of argument in favor of 
regulating private conduct"); but cf. Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral 
Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003) (articulating a 
theory of "asymmetric paternalism" which would protect irrational individuals while not harming rational 
ones).  That "paternalism" serves a progressive agenda is debatable.   
41
 Some argue that BLE experiments are flawed in design or execution.  See, e.g., Tanina Rostain, 
Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the New Behavioral Law and Economics Movement,
34 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 973 (2000) (discussing problems of laboratory research); Robert E. Scott, The Limits 
of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603 (2000) (describing problem of 
generalizing from limited experimental data).  The most prominent of these critics argues that some 
experiments seemed designed to elicit nonrational responses, because of explicit or implicit cues to 
experimental subjects: 
Virtually all of the claims of the [BLE theorists are] . . . at most, linguistic hedges, such as the data 
"suggest" some effect or some effect "generally" occurs, but not outright admissions that legal 
decision theory is founded on generalizations that are shakily inferred from aggregated data in 
between- subjects experiments.
Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously?  The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New 
Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 1977-84 (2002) (attacking methodology of 
BLE).
Robert Prentice has responded that Mitchell's claim amounts to an argument "about details", as Mitchell 
admits that the rational actor model does not "in any way approximate[] how people actually act."  Robert 
A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 
1663, 1720 (2003) (defending BLE experiments against Mitchell's "withering attack"). 
42 See, e.g., Denise E. Antolini, Punitive Damages in Rhetoric and Reality: An Integrated Empirical 
Analysis of Punitive Damages in Hawaii, 1985-2001, 20 J.L. & POL. 143, 151-53 (2004) (discussing Exxon 
Corporation funding of jury experiments); Theodore Eisenberg, Damage Awards in Perspective: Behind 
the Headline-Grabbing Awards in Exxon Valdez and Engle, 36 WAKE. FORR. L. REV.1129, 1147-49 (2002) 
(discussing Exxon funding of anti-jury scholarship); Neil Vidmar, Juries Don't Make Legal Decisions! And 
Other Problems: A Critique of Hastie et al. on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 705, 713 
(1999) (same); Richard Lempert, Juries, Hindsight, and Punitive Damage Awards: Failures of a Social 
Science Case for Change, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 867, 871 n.16 (1999) ("[I]t appears that Exxon is making a 
concerted effort to build a social science case for reducing or taking away the jury's discretion in awarding 
punitive damages and that the Hastie and Viscusi study is a part of this effort. ... Indeed, Exxon has recently 
cited the above research in its appeal of the $5.3 billion Exxon Valdez award.").  For a theoretical account 
of how Exxon's funding of BLE research might affect its conclusions, see Jon Hanson and David Yosifon, 
The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep 
Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 273-279 (2003) (discussing possible "deep capture" of legal academics 
by corporate funding).
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But, even if private parties are using BLE to further their own ends, this does not 
substantially imperil BLE’s core message.  BLE is a critical empirical study driven by 
observations of indeterminacy and manipulability of individual choices in reaction to 
stimuli.43  Decision-makers act under the influence of several cognitive biases and 
heuristics that distort their ability to rationally make decisions, each of which "pushes" in 
a different direction.  In the aggregate, it is difficult to predict what individuals will do.44
As significantly, individuals’ perceptions of risk (which, in the rational actor model exists 
independently of the observer) turn out to be manipulable in practice, through the context 
and framing of its presentation.45 On this understanding of BLE’s core message of 
manipulability, I embrace BLE’s experimental data with an appropriate amount of 
caution,46 which I hope the reader will share.47
In the last two to three years, scholars have endeavored to bring additional 
coherence to BLE by creating models of brain activity that help explain BLE’s results.  
These scholars, developing a new strand of scholarship called "neuroeconomics," attempt 
43 See generally Hanson & Kysar, supra n. 22, at 722.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 724-743. 
46
 I am particularly dubious of generalizing claims about perceptions of risk or use of information, because 
the central message of BLE (again) is the indeterminacy and manipulability of behavior.  In parts of this 
paper, I make sweeping generalizations.  When I do so, I am aware that such claims are susceptible to 
reversal if the question had been presented differently.
47
 A separate critique relates to BLE's need for a unifying theory.  See, e.g., Russell B. Korbkin and Thomas 
S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Sciences: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 
CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1057. 1071-72 (2000) (the BLE movement "lacks a single, coherent theory of 
behavior.").  According to Korobkin and Ulen, the goal of BLE ought to be to allow scholars to predict 
"with reasonable success" the responses of citizens to applicable legal rules.  Id. at 1072.  Thus, BLE need 
not articulate a theoretical model to compete with the rational actor model, so long as its results are 
realistic.  Korobkin and Ulen, id., at 1058, 1071-73; Hanson & Kysar, supra n. 22, at 687-693 ("a complex 
model with realistic predictive capabilities is far preferable to a simplified model that bears little 
relationship to actual behavior.")  Korobkin and Ulen analogize BLE's atheoretical core to the process of 
incomplete theorization in common law adjudication, citing to Cass Sunstein's work on incompletely 
theorized arguments.  See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 35-
61 (1996).  Curiously, law and economics itself has often resorted to the contention that the best is the 
enemy of the good.  See, e.g., Hoffman & O'Shea, supra n. 38, at 344 (criticizing the "open-ended approach 
to moral and practical questions" common in law and economics literature, and discussing application of 
Sunstein's theory of incompleteness to legal movements).
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to divine organic causes to explain BLE’s experimental results.48 Scientists collect data 
on how various stimulants effect brain activity by directly imaging the brain using MRI-
like machines.49 Specifically, scientists watch how blood flows to different regions of the 
brain when individuals are engaged in economic transactions, noting which parts of the 
brain are engaged by different choice behaviors.50
To make sense of BLE’s application to the securities laws, the discussion below 
divides into three parts, corresponding to the three categorical ways that BLE undermines 
the contractarian thesis which still dominates academic discussion: Trouble With 
Probability; Trouble With Informational Processing; and Social Investing.  The purpose 
of this organization (which I used to make sense of the bewildering array of social 
science results) is not to suggest that individuals are necessarily subject to discrete and 
self-contained biases that each distort "rationality," but rather to describe how BLE 
systematically undermines rationality’s major premises.  We begin with probability. 
1. Trouble with Probability
Individuals are exceptionally poor at evaluating risk and uncertainty.  This is old 
news– after all, the multi-billion dollar, enormously profitable gambling industry depends 
on a certain amount of willful blindness to the reality of expected losses.  But, our trouble 
with risk goes beyond decisions to play against the house.51  Rather, as this section 
48 See, e.g., Terrence Chorvat et al., Law and Neuroeconomics 45 (George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, Law 
& Econ. Research Paper No. 04-07, 2004), http//ssrn.com/abstract= 501063; RICHARD RESTAK, THE NEW 
BRAIN 3 (2003); Colin F. Camerer, George F. Loewenstein, Drazen Prelec, Neuroeconomics: How 
Neuroscience Can Inform Economics, J. ECON. LIT., (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=590965; William J. Gehring & Adrian R. Willoughby, 
The Medial Frontal Cortex and the Rapid Processing of Monetary Gains and Losses, 295 SCI. 2279, 2279-
81 (2002).
49 See Chorvat et al., supra n. 48, at 14-15.
50 Id. at 15.
51
 Gambling may be thought of rational because it is "fun."  But, presumably, whatever "fun" individuals
achieve while losing money in a casino because they misjudge the odds of winning in Craps is distinct from 
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explores, our approaches to risks and rewards are bafflingly inconsistent, and often (in 
the aggregate) self-defeating.
a. Hindsight Bias
"Hindsight bias" is a dressed-up term for our belief in destiny: that which has 
happened was likely to have happened all along.52 This bias follows from individuals’ 
consistent overstatements of "what they could have been predicted after events have 
unfolded."53  Hindsight bias results from the (common sense) tendency of our brains to 
incorporate new information into existing information automatically.54  Indeed, some 
hypothesize that the brain prefers "simple inference strategies that require little 
information" to complicated strategies that hinge on a lot of information.55
To situate our understanding of how the hindsight bias might affect the capital 
markets, imagine that a corporation is considering, at time T0,  whether to disclose the 
existence of a risk of a strike that will close one of its factories, and (if it occurs) create a 
very modest downturn in profits.  The risk of the strike at time T 0 is miniscule – a 
the experience of losing your life savings in the stock market because you are unable to assess the risk of an 
investment.  This reduces to an intuition that while gambling is primarily experienced as an entertaining 
spectacle, capital investing is not. 
52 See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, in
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra n. 22, at 95 (describing cognitive and motivational factors 
creating the bias); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 
OR. L. REV. 61, 67-70 (2000) (discussing bias); Korobkin and Ulen, supra n. 32, at 1095-100.  In one 
example, two groups of individuals were confronted with a problem involving a railroad accident. The first 
group was to assume that they were regulators, tasked to determine whether a corporation should make 
repairs pursuant to regulation to avoid a railroad accident.  Others were asked to assume they were jurors, 
after the accident had occurred, and asked about the necessity of punitive damages.  Thirty-eight percent 
(38%) of the regulators recommended the repairs, while (subject to hindsight bias) sixty-seven percent 
(67%) of jurors recommended punitive damages.  CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW 
JURIES DECIDE 100-108 (2002). The experimenters noted that the problem of hindsight bias is an "almost 
inevitable" result of citizen control over legal decisions.  Id. at 108.  
53
 Gulati et al., supra n. 23, at 773.  In this important recent article, Gulati et al. test two hypothesis which 
could explain why courts have advanced the theory of fraud by hindsight: to debias limitations on human 
judgment like hindsight bias; or, alternatively, to dispose of troublesome and complicated cases.  They 
conclude that the latter hypothesis finds more support.  Id. at 818.
54
 Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judgments of Past Events After Outcomes Are 
Known, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 311, 311-14 (1990).
55
 Beth Azar, Blinded By Hindsight, 31 MON. PSYCH. 5 (May 2000).
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contemporaneous email between managers puts the risk at 1%.  Given the risk-
discounted cost,56 the corporation decides to hide the possibility of the strike from its 
investors.
The strike occurs at time T1, with the expected, minor, effect on profitability.  The 
corporation’s stock falls (T2),57 and the corporation is sued by disgruntled shareholders 
for failing to disclose the risk (T3).
Should a jury, considering the corporation’s potential liability for this omission at 
T4, consider as important to the decision of an investor at T0, the strike’s occurrence at 
T1?  No.58  The fact that a later event comes to pass makes no difference to the investing 
decision at the time of disclosure, just as my hitting a red six while playing roulette does 
not make that number the "smart" choice before the fact.  That is, if a "reasonable 
investor" means "an investor who thinks without bias about risk," the legal system would 
want to find a way to prevent plaintiffs from successfully asserting this kind of claim in a 
securities suit. BLE, however, seems to demonstrate that juries are usually unable to 
reject this kind of thinking: we are all subject to hindsight bias regarding materiality.  The 
question then becomes – as I address below – should judges prohibit the hindsight 




 That is, the probability of loss times the magnitude of harm resulting from loss is small compared to the 
burden of disclosure (whether measured in incremental terms or even in lost negotiating leverage with the 
union).
57
 Or, it doesn't.  See infra Part III (discussing the (im)materiality of price change).
58 Gulati et al., supra n. 23, at 789.
59
 A question is why judges would be any better than juries at avoiding the effects of hindsight.  See W. Kip 
Viscusi, Juries, Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J. LEG. STUD. 107 (2001) 
(discussing problems judges have in evaluating risk). 
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BLE teaches that individuals also have a great deal of trouble shedding the effects 
of the "representiveness heuristic" by which they overestimate the relationship between 
what things are and what they appear to be.60
A famous experiment demonstrating this effect presented subjects with a 
description of a woman with "feminist characteristics." Experimenters then asked the 
subjects a relatively odd question: is the woman more likely to be (a) a bank teller; or (b) 
a feminist bank teller.  Logically, (a) must be more common than (b) (because of base 
rate – there must be more bank tellers than political bank tellers, and more political bank 
tellers than feminist ones).  Nevertheless, because respondents were unable to shed the 
effect of what they had already known about the woman, 90% of them chose answer 
(b).61
The representativeness heuristic appears to hold even when investors discover or 
have reason to know that informa tion is unreliable.62  Thus, despite facts suggesting 
fraud, investors will act on the representations of a broker who they know (or have reason 
to know) has a motive to lie to them, because that broker had previously demonstrated 
some characteristics of a reliable source.63  Similarly, investors will trade on gossip from 
internet chat rooms, if the gossiping source displays some characteristics of being a 
corporate insider (such as, for example, purported knowledge of corporate trivia "inside 
60 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by Representativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCER TAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 84 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982);  See also Hanson & 
Kysar, supra n. 22, at 664-669.
61 Id. at 92-93.
62See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra n. 60, at 7-11 (people make the same predictions about future 
events irregardless of how much they trust the information that founds their conclusions).
63 See Prentice, supra n. 31,  at 368-9.
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baseball" discussions of politics within the company).  Needless to say, academics have 
questioned whether rational investors could possibly have found such hype credible.64
To illustrate how this heuristic work s in the capital markets, suppose a 
shareholder is told by her broker to invest in a particular stock.  The shareholder has had 
experiences with that broker, and believes him to be a truth-telling, upstanding 
professional.  Along with his recommendation, the broker passes her a prospectus 
containing written warnings about the stock’s performance, together with financials that 
(had the shareholder read them) would have cast doubt on the broker’s representations.  
Economically rational investors should pass on the recommendation.  However, 
the representative heuristic suggests that most investors will invest based on their 
previous dealings with the broker, unable to shed old illusions in the face of contrary new 
information.  
c. Risk Tolerance
Individuals are risk-seeking in avoiding current losses.65 Loss aversion is a 
common (and depressingly familiar) phenomenon.  We hold "under water" stocks for 
longer that we ought, in the hope of reversing the tide.66 Readers who do not participate 
in the stock market may be familiar with the phenomenon in other settings: deciding to 
"press your luck" by returning to the ATM machine when down while gambling; being 
unable to imagine (that is, being unwilling to confront the risk of) unlikely future 
64 See Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to 
Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 157 (2002).
65 See, e.g., Prentice, supra n. 31, at 364; See also Terrance Odean, Volume, Volatility and Profit When All 
Traders Are Above Average, 1887 J. FIN. 934 (1998) (discussing tendency of individual investors to buy 
the same number of winning and losing stocks, but to sell winning stocks at a higher rate).
66 See Choi and Pritchard, supra n. 21, at13.
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catastrophic losses; 67 or refusing to sell your house for years longer than necessary in the 
hope/expectation that of eventually getting "your money" back.
BLE tells us a different story with respect to gains: individuals are risk averse 
when confronting a choice between certain property and potential gains.  Thus, while a 
rational shareholder would be equally happy to accept either of a dividend stream with a 
present value of $100, or a potential rise in stock resulting in present value gains of either 
0 or $200, real individuals actually prefer the certain gain.68
Loss aversion may be related to the endowment effect. 69 The endowment effect 
describes the higher value we place on things we own than on those we do not.  The 
classic experiment involves coffee mugs.  Experimenters gave a group of experimental 
subjects (the "buyers") money; a second group (the "sellers") plain coffee mugs.70
Experiments asked the sellers to name the minimum price they would demand to sell 
their mugs, and the buyers the maximum they would pay.  Both groups were told that if 
market prices were established, trades would occur.  But when the results were in, no
trades were possible because the buyers who "owned" the mugs were willing to pay, on 
average, only half the amount demanded by the sellers.71  This result contravenes one
67 See Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer Form 
Contracts, 47 U. MIA. L. REV. 1263, 1301 (1993).  An interesting corollary to this principle is that 
individuals, because they discount the likelihood of future losses, will be less sensitive to warnings about 
such losses. See also Choi and Pritchard, supra n. 21, at 12 (availability heuristic); Prentice, supra n. 31, at 
364.
68 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 124 
(1996).  I assume away the tax implications of the choice.
69
 Also, as some have noted, there may be times when the principle of loss aversion and the endowment 
effect are in tension with each other (in a sharply falling market, for example, the endowment effect would 
counsel retaining stocks while the need to avoid losses would suggest selling).  See Hanson and Kysar, 
supra n. 22, at 690.
70
 There was no coffee in the mugs. Had there been, one might fairly understand the result of the 
experiment given the expected utility accompanying a full cup of coffee.
71 See Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. 
POL. ECON. 1325 (1990).
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predicted by the rational choice model – that both groups will value the mugs 
identically.72
To appreciate the interaction of these principles, imagine a few disclosures by a 
corporation that has r ecently had a run of very bad luck.  It states that "things are looking 
up"; that "we have no reason to expect that current bad trends will continue"; and "the 
future is bright."  While rational shareholders would ignore such meaningless boasts, real 
shareholders might not because they are subject to loss aversion.  By contrast, 
shareholders whose holdings have recently appreciated may overreact to relatively 
innocuous earnings warnings, seeking to "take" sure gains instead of facing the risk of 
losing them.
d. Overconfidence.  
Have you ever made (to yourself, in the privacy of your home) one of the 
following statements:  I am a better driver than average;73 I am a better cook than 
average; I am a better dancer than average.74  Join the club.  Most citizens (90% of 
drivers) believe they possess better skills than the norm.75  Similarly, most investors think 
they will beat the market.  Most people are mistaken.76  BLE teaches that investors 
believe that "good things are more likely than average to happen to [their stock] and bad 
things are less likely than average to happen to [it]."77
72 See Korobkin and Ulen, supra n. 32, at 1108,n.235.
73
 But I am!
74
 In the face of persuasive anecdotal (or statistical) evidence to the contrary. 
75 See Robert H. Frank, Why Is Cost-Benefit Analysis So Controversial?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 913, 929
(2000).
76
 Assuming that the capital markets are efficient over the long term, no investor can regularly exceed 
market returns. To the extent that markets are inefficient over the short term, fully rational or especially 
savvy investors may take profits.  But, by definition, not all investors can be fully rational or especially 
savvy.
77
 Korobkin and Ulen, supra n. 32, at 1091; See also Lynn Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68 
BROOK. L. REV. 407, 420-26 (2002) (discussing investor overconfidence as a function of trust).
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Investors in particular put too much weight on "privately acquired information"
and are unable to fairly judge their ability to exceed the market.78  A classic example of 
investor overconfidence is the prevalence of so-called "day-traders" in the late 1990s’
market bubble.79  These traders were known for their short patience with holding stock
and high trading volume.  Day traders, disproportionately young men, achieved 
notoriously low returns relative to the broader market indexes.80
Applying this bias is easy.  Assume that every corporation in a segment of the 
farming industry announces on the same day a possible investigation by the FTC into a 
price fixing conspiracy.  Each company proclaims its innocence. An investor holds stock 
in Corporation GiantFarm, one of the companies named by the FTC, and must decide 
whether to sell her stock.  Overoptimistic thinking leads to the following internal 
conversation:  "Each company asserts its innocence.  But good things are more likely to 
happen to me and the corporations I own than to others and the corporations they own.  
Therefore, GiantFarm is not as likely to be crooked as others in the farming industry.  I 
will hold on to my stock for a while yet."
e.  Experiential Thinking
These problems with risk analysis appear to be without a unifying theme.  
However, they may be harmonized when we consider the emotional content of risk 
perception.  BLE teaches that individuals make decisions through two distinct methods: a 
78 See Langevoort, supra n. 64, at 146.
79
 Choi and Pritchard, supra n. 21, at 11; Denis J. Hilton, Psychology and the Financial Markets: 
Applications to Understanding and Remedying Irrational Decision-Making, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
ECONOMIC DECISIONS VOLUME I: RATIONALITY AND WELL BEING 276 (Brocas and Carrillo eds. 2003) 
(discussing day trading and overconfidence generally).
80 See Choi and Pritchard, supra n. 21, at 12.
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"rational system"; and an "emotionally driven experiential system."81  The former 
decisions are "logical, deliberate and abstract."82
Because the "rational system" is so complex and demands cognitive resources 
from other tasks, individuals "typically rely" on a more emotional method of decision
making associated with "intuitive judgments, emotional responses, and other subtle, 
nonconscious reactions to stimuli."83  Using "experiential thinking," individuals process 
risk using an "affect" consisting of that individual’s preexisting emotional construct.  
For example, a feeling of "dread" may be associated with certain technologies 
(like genetic manipulation), and individuals’ perceptions of risks of that technology are
accordingly increased.84  On the other hand, if individuals have a preexisting emotional 
positive feeling about a technology (like, for example, miniature computers), then the 
risks associated with further developments in that technological area may be perceived to 
be smaller than they really are (e.g., risks of nanotechnology.) The "affect" associated 
with risk judgment is strongly influenced by demographic factors.85  Risk perception is 
culturally dependant.86
Thus, when a corporation discloses a risk, individuals may perceive it as either 
vastly more important than it "objectively" is, or much less important, depending on its 
accompanying affect.87  Individual shareholders are bad scientists.  Risks that may seem 
81
 Hanson & Kysar, supra n. 22, at 669-672.
82 Id. at 669.
83 Id. at 669.
84 Id. at 670; See also Hilton, supra n. 79, at 284 (collecting studies).
85 See infra Part IV.
86 PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK, RISK SOCIETY AND POLICY SERIES (Earthscan, 2000).
87
 A third option, that emotional affect has no corresponding effect is also plausible.
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"trivial" to courts in the cold light of day can be accompanied by a large emotional heft 
for shareholders at the time of disclosure.88
2. Trouble with Information Processing
A second category of BLE research deals with individuals’ inabilities to process 
information in rational ways.  This research questions how humans try to differentiate 
relevant from irrelevant information and prioritize what to focus on.  Some examples 
follow.
a. Source Blindness.
BLE research has disclosed that even when individuals are convinced of the 
veracity of contrary information, they change their views slowly in the face of persuasive 
evidence; that is, new information is processed against the background of what came 
before.89
As we saw before, investors are particularly likely to believe analyst reports when 
those reports are affected by the representativeness heuristic.90  However, where investors 
look at analyst reports absent a personal connection with the broker, they are still unable 
to discount the potential biases and ignorance of the analysts, despite reasons to believe 
such problems are severe.91 Nevertheless, scholars often assert that reliance on analyst 
reports is irrational.92
88
 In other areas of the law, judges apply this insight, recalling, for example, that  "[d]etached reflection 
cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife." Brown v. U.S., 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921).
89
 Langevoort, supra n. 64, at 144.
90 See supra Section I(1)b
91 See Nowicki, supra n. 17, at 1327 n.78; Hilton, supra n. 79, at 278 (collecting literature).
92
 John C. Coffee, Jr., Security Analyst Litigation, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 20, 2001, at 5; Nowicki, supra n. 17, at 
1327 (discussing arguments).
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Individuals also consistently overweigh the importance of oral information (a 
heuristic which is especially problematic in the securities context).93  Therefore, investors 
who hear about a stock through a report on television will be more influenced to buy (or 
sell) than those who merely read a prospectus.94  Similarly, investors who listen to
"analyst calls" will be affected disproportionately: oral representations have "significantly 
more persuasive impact than written disclaimers contained in a subsequently signed 
contract."95
b. The Framing Effect
Significantly, perceptions of risks and benefits are subject to manipulation by 
corporations because of the existence of the so-called "framing effect."  The classic 
experiment with respect to framing presented subjects with a very hard problem: they 
were asked to select between treatment programs for a disease otherwise marked by a 
100% mortality rate (with a 600 person population infected).96  There were four 
programs:
• Program A: 200 people will be saved.
• Program B:    33.3% chance that the entire population will be saved; 66.6% 
chance that none of the population will be saved.97
• Program C:    400 people will die.
• Program D:    33.3% chance that none of the population will die; 66.6% chance 
that the entire population will die.
93
 Prentice, supra n. 31, at 348-9; 369-371.
94 STEVEN R. DROZDECK & KARL F. GRETZ, THE BROKER'S EDGE: HOW TO SELL SECURITIES IN ANY 
MARKET 222 (1995) (letter delivers 7 percent of the message conveyed in a face-to-face presentation), cited
in Prentice, supra n. 31, at 370.
95
 Prentice, supra n. 31, at 370.
96
 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 341, 343 (1984).
97
 Amoes Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. § 251, § 
255 (1986).
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Rational actors, seeking to maximize lives saved, would be indifferent between 
these choices, as they result in the same predicted outcome: 200 lives saved, 400 lives 
lost.98 However, when one group of subjects was asked to choose between programs A 
and B, 72% chose A; when a second group was asked to choose between C and D, 78% 
chose D.99  Why?  Because of "framing effects."  A is preferable to B because it 
guarantees lives saved (recall the preference for guaranteed gains discussed above); C is 
less attractive than D because it guarantees lives lost (recall the risk-seeking preferences 
of individuals with respect to avoiding future losses).100
Some researchers suggest that a "cognitive-affective tradeoff" produces the framing 
effect.101  Experiments have shown that a person expends more cognitive effort when "choosing 
a guaranteed gain" than when "selecting a risky gain."102 In general, people expend both little 
cognitive and affective efforts when confronted with a guaranteed gain.103  Consequently, they 
tend to prefer a guaranteed gain over a risky one. This choice suggests that people seek to avoid 
"the cognitive cost involved in evaluating a gain and the emotions involved in imagining an 
uncertain reward."104 On the other hand, a person expends an equal amount of cognitive effort 
98
 Hanson & Kysar, supra n. 22, at 644.
99
 Kahneman and Tversky, Choices, supra n. 96, at 343.
100
 Hanson & Kysar, supra n. 22, at 644-45.  In another experiment, investors were presented with two 
retirement funds with different risk profiles: bonds (relatively safe) and stocks (relatively risky).  The 
employees were shown the historical data on the returns of each fund (and thus should have been able to 
confirm the expected outcomes and risk profiles).  However, the data was framed differently.  One group of 
employees only received one-year returns, the other group was shown a simulated 30-year distribution.  
Almost all the employees seeing the longer distribution invested in more risky return, and visa versa. Jolls, 
Sunstein & Thaler, supra n. 39, at 1534.
101
 Cleotilde Gonzales, Jason Dana, Hideya Koshino, and Marcel Just, The Framing Effect and Risky Decisions: 
Examining Cognitive Functions with fMRI, 26 Journal of Economic Psychology, 1, 4 (2005).
102 Id. at 13.
103 Id. at 15.
104 Id.
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when selecting a "guaranteed loss" as she does when selecting a "risky loss, "105 suggesting an 
organic cause for risk seeking in the face of losses.
Frames are obviously quite significant when thinking about corporate disclosure 
in the securities fraud context.106  Information about losses will be discounted if framed 
as a mere future probability; information about gains will be overemphasized when 
presented as a certain near term result.107
c. Information Overload 
Rational shareholders are presumptively able to evaluate the thousandth page in a 
prospectus just as well as the first.  However, BLE experimental results teach us that as a 
decision maker is given more information, decision quality increases up to a point, but 
eventually declines.108
This result is predicted by the theory of bounded rationality: rationality bounded 
on the one hand by the context and content of the task we are facing and on the other by 
our own cognitive limitations.109  As a result of information overload, shareholders may 
rely on heuristics to permit them to make better decisions, such as choosing a fund based 
on its managers instead of its fundamentals.110
3. Social Investing
105 Id. 
106 See, e.g., Hilton, supra n. 79, at 288-293 (discussing psychological insights for financial products 
marketing efforts).
107
 Thus, corporations are rewarded by the market for engaging in accounting techniques that maximize 
short term gains.  See Henry T.C. Hu, Corporate Governance: Buffet, Corporate Objectives, and the 
Nature of Sheep, 19 CARD. L. REV. 379, 386 (1997).
108
 Paredes, supra n. 26, at 441; but  see David M. Grether et al., The Irrelevance of Information Overload: 
An Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 278-294 (1986) (arguing that information 
overload is irrelevant because people adopt simplified decisionmaking procedures to cope with increased 
information); Korobkin and Ulen, supra n. 32, at 1078 (describing experiments where subjects were less 
likely to maximize their utility when purchasing a house as the number of its attributes increased beyond 
ten).
109
 Paredes, supra n. 26, at 435.
110
 Choi and Pritchard, supra n. 21, at 13 (noting that such a heuristic may be rational, as managing 
underwriters with particular experience might be better at avoiding fraud).
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Thus far, I have discussed investing and irrational investors as if they acted in a 
vacuum, making (bad) decisions from the comfort of their study, isolated from other 
people.  But, this picture of investing is highly unrealistic.  Investors run in herds.
Indeed, "[w]hat explains fads like Beanie Babies and Pokemon?"111  Why do 
laugh tracks work; why does a commercial telling us that a detergent is "best selling"
cause us to buy it?  Why did investors participate in the Dutch Tulip market bubble?  
These questions can be answered, in part, by analyzing investor "herd behavior," whereby 
each investor devolves to another the decision to invest in the market, resulting in 
stampedes as market followers follow market leaders.112
There is evidence of herd behavior in capital markets: investors following others 
into popular portfolios, conventional stocks, and suboptimal bond issues.113 However, 
the actual mechanism for such movement is quite obscure.114  There is also evidence that 
herd behavior decreases as market sophistication increases.115  As some scholars have 
noted, the prevalence of herd behavior may be explained in terms of network externalities 
– some products and stocks become more valuable as more people use them (the common 
example is a personal computer,116 but a more relevant example for readers may be the 
BARBRI exam review course).117
111
 Bainbridge, supra n. 38, at 1037-38.
112
 Prentice, supra n. 31, at 373.
113
 Bainbridge, supra n. 38, at 1038.
114
 Langevoort, supra n. 64, at 159.
115
 Bainbridge, supra n. 38, at 1039-40; Zohar Gosher and Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential  Role of 
Securities Regulation, Working Paper No. 259, The Columbia Law School Center for Law and Economic 
Studies, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=600709, at 16 (arguing that one group of market participants, 
"noise traders" engage in herd behavior and are competitively disadvantaged vis a vis more sophisticated 
investors).
116
 Bainbridge, supra n. 38, at 1041.  
117
 That is, as more students use BARBRI, its usefulness in helping students pass the Bar, a curved exam, 
increases. The reason is that if the majority of students believe that X is the answer to a given question 
(when it is not) failure to know that answer will not hurt a student's chances to pass.  The interesting thing 
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Some explain the case of Jonathan Lebed, a New Jersey teenager who allegedly 
bought stock in small companies and then hyped those companies on the internet, as a 
story of herd behavior.118 The SEC prosecuted Lebed on the theory that shareholders had 
relied on his false hype in purchasing shares, but reached a settlement.119 Is this an 
example of individual investors following others in investing in penny stocks without 
thought?  Perhaps so, but it also demonstrates the pernicious effects of the 
representativeness heuristic and source blindness, as explained above.
In sum, BLE teaches that individual investors are unlikely to respond rationally to 
corporate disclosures: their behavior depends heavily on the context and presentation of 
disclosures.  
Part II: Empirical Analysis of Materiality
The materiality element in securities law requires the decision maker to reach 
conclusions about the way investors behave in response to corporate action.  The 
"reasonable" part of the standard's definition suggests that the decision maker need not be 
a jury, because some behaviors will be so "unreasonable" as to be resolvable as a matter 
of law. Materiality, then, creates a need for courts to articulate and defend a series of 
commitments and assumptions about how investors act.
My thesis is that courts, in analyzing securities law, generally adhere to the 
foundational assumption of corporate law: investors act rationally.120 Presumed 
immateriality functions as a channeling doctrine to exclude from the universe of 
about this claim is that it proves too much: if all students took BARBRI, the BARBRI-effect would 
disappear.
118 See generally Richard Walker & David Levine, You've Got Jail: Current Trends in Internet Securities 
Fraud, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 405 (2001) (extensive discussion of Lebed case).
119 Langevoort, supra n. 64, at 156. 
120 See infra text accompanying notes 26 through 37.
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meritorious cases those in which plaintiffs’ behavior, if proven, would be different from 
the behavior predicted by the rational investor model.  But as I just discussed, BLE 
teaches us that individuals do not process disclosures rationally; courts’ equation of
reasonableness with rationality is essentially a normative move.
This policy choice can be brought to light through empirical analysis of a large 
sample of federal securities law cases.  Empiricism is particularly helpful here because 
courts’ words are so at odds with their words.  When courts first introduced presumed 
immateriality, they argued it would protect investors against managers’ overreacting to 
liability concerns and "bury[ing] the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information –
a result that is hardly conducive to informed decisionmaking."121  That is, presumed 
immateriality was said to be an attempt to set appropriate corporate disclosure activity 
levels: too much activity overly burdens corporations without a corresponding increased 
benefit to investors. 
If the cases followed the language of courts’ opinions, and managing corporate 
activity was courts’ actual goal, several empirical results would follow.  
• Presumed immateriality would be rare, as courts say that it is. 
• Presumed immateriality would vary with changes in political control
(more enforcement, less presumed immateriality) as courts work to 
smooth effects on corporate activity.  
• Presumed immateriality would be sensitive to procedure, because to 
accurately change activity levels, courts ought to let plaint iffs’ allegations 
of reliance on false disclosures proceed to trial unless persuasive evidence
is submitted to the contrary.122  Therefore, there should be relatively fewer 
findings of presumed immateriality earlier in the life of a lawsuit (i.e.
121 TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 448.
122
 Overuse of presumed immateriality results in insufficient enforcement (and, therefore, under-disclosure); under 
use of presumed immateriality has the opposite effect.
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fewer such decisions on motions to dismiss and more on motions for 
summary judgment).123
• There would be no significant difference between government and private 
plaintiff win rates on the materiality issue.  To understand this claim, 
recall that both the government and private plaintiffs need to satisfy the 
identical objective test: would a reasonable shareholder have been moved 
by the allegedly misleading disclosure.  Government suits should, 
presumably, have similar effects on corporate activity levels as private 
plaintiff suits.124 Therefore, the rate at which courts dismiss any 
disclosure as immaterial (among many offered in each suit) should be 
unaffected by a plaintiff's identity.
As we will see, each of these predictions turns out to be false, suggesting that 
courts’ applications of presumed immateriality are doing something other than merely 
affecting corporate behavior.  Indeed, the data leads me to conclude that use of this 
doctrine results in incentives that are profoundly in tension with BLE, thus rewarding
individuals for acting in ways inconsistent with ordinary intuitions.
I began my empirical project by first defining the universe: federal courts 
applying the "reasonable shareholder" standard over the past thirty years, after the 
Supreme Court issued TSC Industries.125  Because the number of cases was 
123
 Some might object that this hypothesis ignores the effects of settlement.  Obviously, most securities 
cases settle. Private plaintiff suits were represented in my dataset as follows: 44% resolved motions to 
dismiss stage; 23% motions for summary judgment; and 17% appeals.  The remainder of cases had mixed 
procedural postures, were post-trial motions, or were cases seeking injunctive relief.  This data suggests 
that around half of cases disappear at each of the two major stages in the life of a securities lawsuit: after 
motion to dismiss, and after summary judgment.  These disappearing cases are either being settled or 
dismissed outright.
One way the settlement effect could play out is that cases later in the life of a lawsuit are relatively 
more likely to be weaker (because "stronger" cases will settle earlier).  But this seems too simple an 
analysis. There are many factors influencing the likelihood of settlement: the amount at stake; plaintiffs' 
counsel resources; defendants' resources; the involvement of the court with settlement discussions; the 
tolerance of the defendant for publicity.  There is no reason, in the aggregate, to believe that the fact most 
cases settle should distort judge's findings of immateriality.    Cf. Krawiec & Zeiler, supra n. 5, at 43 
(discussing effect of settlement in common law disclosure context).
124
 For a further discussion of this issue, See infra at text accompanying notes 215 through 219.
125
 I ran the following search on the Westlaw databases for the Second Circuit, the Southern District of 
New York, the Eastern District of New York, the Western District of New York, the Northern District of 
New York, the District of Connecticut, and the District of Vermont: "'108 S.Ct. 978' or '426 U.S. 438' or 
'485 U.S. 224' or '96 S.Ct. 2126' and rational! reasonable! lay ordinary intelligen! average /1 shareholder 
stockholder investor."  This search thus tests for citations to either TSC Industries or Basic when courts 
also analyze any of the possible variants on the materiality standard.  I used the citations because different 
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overwhelmingly large, I limited my analysis to cases arising in the Second Circuit and its 
district courts.126 The resulting data set, from 1976 through the end of November 2004,127
was 471 cases.128 In 88 cases, there was no actual finding that any disclosure was 
material, possibly material, or immaterial.129 I then coded (by marking information on a 
separate page)130 the remaining 383 cases.131  It is important to note that this dataset is not 
entirely complete and sampling issues may have skewed my results.132
courts might use distinct abbreviations and bluebook forms for case names.   Undoubtedly, there are some 
cases even within the Second Circuit which treat the subject of materiality, but do not cite either TSC 
Indus. or Basic.  See, e.g., Luce v. Edelstein,  802 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.1986) (analyzing materiality, announcing 
the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, but not citing either TSC or Basic).  I can think of no reason why cases 
citing the Supreme Court standard are more likely to find disclosures material or immaterial.  The sample 
should be fairly representative.  
126 This limitation makes sense for three reasons.  First, the Second Circuit and its Southern District are 
widely recognized as uniquely expert in securities law cases. See Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 85 
n.6. Second, the sample provided the largest subset of any of the federal circuits. The next closest sample, 
the Ninth Circuit and its attendant courts, would have yielded under two hundred cases.  An "Allfeds" 
search of the same terms yields 1,628 results; the Second Circuit sample provides approximately one-fourth 
of the total universe of cases.  Third, because the Second Circuit is smaller (in terms of number of appellate 
judges and appellate decisions) than the Ninth, district courts are more constrained in their interpretation of 
the materiality standard, removing or reducing a variable (possible inconsistency within a given time period 
due to appellate incoherence) which I would otherwise have needed to account for.
127
 The same search would produce more cases today.  From December 2004 through January 2005, four 
more cases would have been added to the database.   
128
 Because courts are more likely to write opinions when granting summary judgment or a motion to 
dismiss, Westlaw does not (yet) catalogue orders, and because the older cases in the database are likely to 
comprise mostly "published" cases, my sample overrepresents the absolute percentage of determinations of 
presumed immateriality in securities cases.  However, insofar as securities law cases are more likely to 
result in opinions than other causes of action (because of the length and complexity of the pleadings, and 
the repeat-player advocates), this concern may be overstated.
129
 Such cases fall into many categories.  For example, courts routinely analogize TSC Industries  and Basic
in deciding the materiality of contract or common law fraud claims.  Courts also routinely cite the 
materiality standard, but then proceed to decide a securities fraud case on difference grounds – e.g., no duty 
to disclose, no standing, statute of limitations, failure to satisfy the "in connection with" requirement, etc.
130 For each case, I marked on a separate coding sheet: (1) the date; (2) if the decision was published or 
unpublished; (3) jurisdiction; (4) procedural posture; (5) if there was a finding that any of the disclosures 
considered should be dismissed pursuant to presumed immateriality;  (6) the number of disclosures at issue 
in the materiality analysis; (7) if any such disclosures remained for later materiality determination; and (8) 
the kinds of techniques used to find disclosures immaterial as a matter of law. 
131
 I undertook the initial coding.  I skimmed each case (there were approximately 12,000 pages in the 
dataset) until I found the discussion of materiality, and then read that section with some care.  My research 
assistant, Ms. Yevglevskaya-Wayne, entered the data I had written onto the coding sheet into an excel 
spreadsheet. I asked her to read independently each case in which I had marked a finding of presumed 
immateriality.  When she disagreed with my initial coding, we discussed the case and reached a consensus 
about a proper treatment.  This method resulted in discussion of approximately 100 cases.  I made the final 
determination as to the proper coding of every case. 
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I was particularly interested in exploring the reasons courts gave for applying the 
presumed immateriality doctrine, because the reasons for decisions help us understand 
the model of human behavior courts apply when determining which investors are 
"reasonable" and which are not. Drawing from some recent scholarship,133 and 
developing new categories of my own, I divided such reasons into eight general doctrinal 
techniques.
The discussion in this part, then, is organized into two sets of findings.  First, I 
observe the scope of the doctrine at a general level, dividing that section into four sub-
parts: effect of time on presumed immateriality; effect of party identity; regression of 
After the initial run of coding, I made an additional run through of the data set to locate cases resolving 
preliminary injunctions before trial, a procedural posture I had originally not coded for.  The original data 
collection sheets are in my possession, and are available on request, as is an appendix containing my coding 
of each of the cases.
132
 There are three categories of problems.
First, there is the sampling problem.  Only dispositions with written opinions are represented on Westlaw; 
Westlaw collected fewer opinions in the past than today. Courts denying summary judgment or a motion to 
dismiss are less likely to write an opinion (because of the minimal likelihood of interlocutory appeal).  See
generally Michael J. Davidson, A Modest Proposal: Permit Interlocutory Appeals of Summary Judgment 
Denials, 147 MIL. L. REV. 145, 149 n.23 (1995) (denial of summary judgment not generally subject to 
immediate appeal).  Because findings of presumed immateriality are positively correlated with grants of 
summary judgment or a motion to dismiss, my results contain a higher proportion of "presumed 
immateriality" findings than actually exist, although the effect will be more pronounced for recent cases. 
There may be a further wrinkle, in that motions to dismiss may be relatively more likely to result in an 
opinion in a securities case than a motion for summary judgment.  See Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 
116 n.94 (concluding that securities decisions on motions to dismiss are likely to be published). Motions 
for summary judgment, unlike motions to dismiss, if denied, will often be denied by order (because the 
court knows that a trial will follow, resulting in post-trial motions and a need to write what would be a 
repetitive opinion).  Thus, as compared to a universe containing all dispositions, I should find a higher 
percentage of findings of presumed immateriality on summary judgment versus motions to dismiss.  See 
also Krawiec & Zeiler, supra n. n. 5 , at 41-43 (discussing problems with collection of opinions on 
Westlaw.)  Given the increased prevalence of electronic dockets in the federal courts, it should be possible 
to construct an error index comparing the rates of opinions on Westlaw to every disposition made by the 
court. 
Second, there is a search problem.  I only looked for cases that cited to Basic and/or TSC Industries.  There 
are cases analyzing materiality which did not cite these landmark decisions (just as there are cases 
analyzing summary judgment that do not cite the Supreme Court's Celotex trilogy).  But I can think of no 
reason why citing to these decisions would make a court more or less likely to make a finding of presumed 
immateriality.  Moreover, failing to cite these seminal cases suggests a certain degree of haste, and would 
have potentially made it harder to discern a court's reasoning.
Third, some cases appeared at multiple places in my dataset.  I coded for each decision as a separate event.   
Although I hoped to have a separate analysis of just the repeated cases, there proved to be too few to 
support any statistically relevant conclusions.  
133
 Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 119-125.
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variables; and effect of procedure.  Second, I discuss the relationship between presumed 
immateriality techniques, and their scope and change over time. 
1. General Findings
a. Presumed immateriality over Time
I first tested the changes in frequency of court findings of presumed immateriality 
over time.134  I divided the cases in my dataset into six time periods, with the effect of 
segregating cases that had been decided under distinct legal frameworks (e.g., cases 
before and after the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Basic v. Levinson and before 
and after the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act).  Each time period contained 
a roughly similar number of cases. 135 The relationship between time and findings of 
immateriality follows in Figure 1. 
134
 Krawiec & Zeiler's paper on common law disclosure duties also tested for the relationship between disclosure 
and time.  See Krawiec & Zeiler, supra n. n. 5, at 77-78. As in this paper, they grouped decisions into periods of 
several years.
135
 The number of cases in each period are displayed below:
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Figure 1 demonstrates that presumed immateriality has increased in frequency in 
recent years.  However, a percentage breakdown (Figure 2) tells a different story:
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As Figure 2 demonstrates, findings of presumed immateriality were especially high in the 
first years following TSC Industries (in 1976).  Findings of presumed immateriality 
decreased from 1986 through 1991136 to a low of 41%, and then rose to a high of 49% 
from 1992 through 1995, before flat-lining in recent years.137  Overall, in the studied 
period, 44% of cases contained at least one finding of presumed immateriality.  This 
136
 An explanation for this decrease is that it coincides with the years after the Supreme Court issued Basic, 
which self-consciously rejected bright-line tests for materiality which (presumably) were increasingly the 
likelihood that courts found disclosures immaterial as a matter of law.
137
 Why?  There are many possibilities.  The one that is most tempting is that there were a higher 
percentage of especially "weak" securities fraud claims in the years before 1995, leading courts to throw 
higher percentages of cases out of court.  Legislative reaction, in the form of the 1995 Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"), resulted in a consolidation in the securities fraud counsel industry, and, 
possibly, a smaller percentage of cases that contained nonmeritorious claims.  See Bruce H. Kobayashi & 
Larry E. Ribstein, Class Action Lawyers as Lawmakers, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 733 (2004) (regarding growth in 
class action firms). Therefore, courts' role in shaping securities fraud became less exigent, and the 
percentage of cases finding presumed immateriality dropped to the 1980s levels.  But, in the absence of a 
statistically significant change, all such explanations appear premature.
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figure is significantly higher than the cautionary language of TSC and Basic would lead 
us to expect.138
However, on further examination of this variance in findings of presumed 
immateriality,139 there was no statistically significant relationship between presumed 
immateriality and time.140 That is, although changes in courts' applications of presumed 
immateriality may be practically important, we cannot attribute them to factors other than 
chance.141
b. Effect of Party Identity
While coding cases, I quickly noticed the important effect of party identity on judicial 
findings of presumed immateriality.  The United States brought 61 of the 383 cases resulting in a 
decision on materiality.142  In only four of these cases (7%) did courts presume immateriality.  
Government plaintiffs prevailed on this issue much more often than private plaintiffs: 93% 
versus 49%.  This difference was strongly statistically significant.143 I display private plaintiff 
presumed immateriality rates in Figure 3: 
138
 Although it is somewhat lower than the percentages found in one recent study.  See Bainbridge and 
Gulati, supra  n. 5, at 116, n.94 (63% of cases finding presumed immateriality).
139
 I performed a one-way analysis of variance test, where a finding of presumed immateriality was the dependant 
variable, and the number of claims was 383.  The P values described below are the probability "of observing any 
outcome as extreme or more extreme than the observed outcomes."  Krawiec & Zeiler, supra n. n. 5, at 54,n.149.  P 
values below 5% are traditionally required to create statistical significance.  Id.
140
 P=.9098.  Although, as I discuss below, some of the specific presumed immateriality techniques do 
demonstrate statistically significant correlations with the passage of time.
141
 For a lucid discussion of the difference between practical and statistical significance, see DAVID W. BARNES, 
STATISTICS AS PROOF: FUNDAMENTALS OF QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE 143-44 (1983).
142
 For the purposes of my analysis, I did not distinguish between civil and criminal enforcement actions.
143
 P<.001.
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c. Regression Analysis
I next used a stepwise regression analysis to determine which variables most 
contributed most to findings of presumed immateriality.  I tested five variables: 




















Percentage of Findings of Presumed Immateriality (Private Plaintiffs Only)
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jurisdiction,144 procedure,145 number of disclosures plaintiffs claimed were material,146
whether the government was a party, and whether the decision had been published.147
This analysis confirmed that the most significant variable in predicting 
presumptive immateriality is whether the government is a party to the suit.148  Controlling 
for party identity, the number of disclosures at issue also predicts the doctrine in a 
statistically significant way.149  And, controlling for party identity and the number of 
disclosures, the only remaining variable that seemed to predict findings of presumed 
immateriality is procedure.150
In view of this result, I tested the remaining data excluding cases where the 
government was a party to avoid having the government’s success rate overwhelm the 
more subtle variables I was examining.151  That is, I wanted to determine whether there 
144
 There should be a higher rate of findings of presumed immateriality at the appellate level than at the district court 
level, for two reasons.  First, many have suggested that increased attention to securities claims should result in lower 
"win" percentages for plaintiffs (as judges carefully sort through the kinds of claims that are and are not actionable).  
In a sense, this is the theory of the PSLRA.  See generally Joseph T. Phillips, A New Pleading Standard Under The 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act?, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 969 (2001).  Second, given that district courts are 
bound by appellate courts, and appellate courts frequently caution district courts not to make findings of presumed 
immateriality, there should be, as a rule, more findings of presumed immateriality at the appellate level.
In the dataset, judges analyzing claims of presumed immateriality agreed with defendants 60% of the time, while at 
the district court level, defendants' success rate was 49%.  However, as noted in the text above, this difference was 
not statistically significant. (P=.13)
145
 I collected data on five different procedural possibilities: motion to dismiss or other preanswer pleading; 
summary judgment; a ruling on a motion for equitable relief; post-trial opinion; and a decision resulting from an 
appeal. However, for the purpose of the stepwise regression analysis, I only tested the subset of opinions resulting 
from motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment.
146
 I summarized this variable as (1) one, (2) two, or (3) three or more claims.
147
 Federal Appellate courts decide that some cases should have precedential effect, "publishing" them. Publication, 
in the district courts occurs in two ways: by court's election (communicated to Westlaw), or by Westlaw's 
independent selection.  See Rod Borlase, West's New Reporter, 
http://www.rodborlase.com/Guides/West's%20Federal% 20Appendix.html (accessed Feb. 12, 2005).  A hypothesis 
is that courts are more likely to consider significant decisions that deny claims of presumed immateriality (if, as 
Gulati and others have argued, the decision to find a case immaterial represents an attempt to shuck securities fraud 
cases from the docket).  Thus, published decisions should have lower rates of presumed immateriality than 
unpublished decisions. 
148
 In this part of the analysis, T is significant at the .001 level.
149
 At a .05 level.
150
 At a .05 level.
151
 Excluding government plaintiffs, the distribution of cases is:
1976-1980 49
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were any statistically interesting characteristics in that part of the dataset (consisting of 
322 cases) where the plaintiff was a private party.
d. Effect of Procedure and Number of Claims
The number of claims plaintiffs assert ought to have a positive relationship with 
the findings of immateriality: the more claims, the more judicial bites at the apple.  And, 
as expected, the number of claims has a statistically significant relationship to findings of 
immateriality.152
However, the story of procedure is more complicated.  I was primarily interested 
in looking at the difference between courts' applications of the materiality doctrine on 
motions to dismiss versus summary judgment.  The numbers follow in Table 1: 





Motions to Dismiss 140 49
Summary Judgment 74 45
Surprisingly, there are comparatively higher findings of presumed immateriality 
on motions to dismiss than on summary judgment.  However, when I tested if this result 
was statistically significant, I found that standing alone, the difference between the 
findings of presumed immateriality on summary judgment and motion to dismiss was 







 P=.05.  Courts considering one or two claims found presumed immateriality 46% of the time; courts considering 
three or more claims found presumed immateriality 61% of the time. 
153
 P=.52
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motions, appeals, and motions for equitable relief, the result did not change.154 That is, 
procedure simply does  not have a statistically significant effect on presumed 
immateriality.155
2. Presumed Immateriality Techniques
When deciding to channel certain kinds of disclosures out of securities fraud 
litigations, courts apply distinctive reasoning.  Just as in, for example, the "fruit of the 
poisonous tree" doctrine in criminal law, or "res ipsa loquitor" in tort, courts apply 
shorthand labels to findings of presumed immateriality. Scholars have identified four 
common techniques in recent works: (1) puffery; (2) bespeaks caution;156 (3) zero price 
change; and (4) triviality.157 Four additional labels for courts’ decisions are present in the 
cases: (5) failure to read; (6) fraud by hindsight;158 (7) truth on the market; and (8) failure 
to understand consequences.
a. Four Traditional Materiality Techniques
First, courts dismiss certain types of statements as "mere puffery" that a 




 As the regression analysis demonstrates, procedure does have some residual effect on the doctrine when 
controlling for party identity and number of claims.  This result may be understood as a consequence of a 
"suppression effect," whereby a variable in a regression which is not correlated with the independent variable, but is 
highly correlated (either negatively or positively) with the other dependant variables will appear to be significant.  
Here, procedure has a statistically significant relationship with each of the other dependant variables.  That is, the 
effect of procedure uncovered by the regression analysis is an artifact, not a reflection of an actual predictive 
relationship between procedure and presumed immateriality.
156
 I am only addressing common law bespeaks caution techniques, and not application of the PSLRA Safe 
Harbor. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5 (2005).  The Safe Harbor is not an immateriality technique, but rather a 
statutorily created immunity.
157 See Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 119-24.
158
 Bainbridge and Gulati identify fraud by hindsight as a determination which affects scienter, which it 
surely does.  See Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 127.  However, as Gulati and others elsewhere have 
hypothesized, fraud by hindsight might be applied by courts in determining materiality as well. Gulati et 
al., supra n. 23, 788- 91.  To the extent courts stated they were determining disclosures were immaterial as a 
matter of law because to hold otherwise would sanction fraud by hindsight, I coded accordingly, even if 
this determination is logically not related to a "true" materiality determination.
159
 Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5, at  94.
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optimism"160 that is "so obviously unimportant to a reasonable investor that reasonable 
minds could not differ."161 As Judge Learned Hand described: "[t] here are some kinds of 
talk which no sensible man takes seriously, and if he does he suffers from credulity."162
In a sense, puffery acts to excuse corporate overoptimism: "[p]eople in charge of an 
enterprise are not required to take a gloomy, fearful or defeatist view of the future …."163
For the purposes of this article, I coded for the puffery technique whenever the 
court explicitly used the word in dismissing statements as presumptively immaterial. I 
also marked the technique as present when courts found statements to be presumptively
immaterial because of their vagueness, general optimism, or lack of specificity, even if 
they did not use the word "puff" or "puffery."  Examples include:
• A statement by the attorney for the fighting promoter Don King, facing a 
possible indictment, "that he did not expect any problems for King" was "like the claims 
of campaign managers before election . . . designed to allay the suspicion which would 
attend their absence than to be understood as having any relation to the objective 
truth."164
• A statement by an IBM executive during a conference call that "we’re not 
– despite your anxiety – concerned about being able to cover the dividend for quite a 
foreseeable time" was "plainly an expression of optimism that [was] too indefinite to be 
actionable."165
160 See Jennifer O'Hare, The Resurrection of the Dodo: The Unfortunate Re-Emergence of the Puffery 
Defense in Private Securities Fraud Actions, 59 OHIO ST. L. J. 1697, 1697 (1998); See generally COX AND 
HAZEN, supra n. 1, at 297.
161 Ganino v. Citizens Utilities Co., 228 F.3d 154, 162 (2nd Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted).
162 Vulcan Metals Co. v. Simmons Mfg. Co., 248 F. 853, 856 (2d Cir. 1918).
163 Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1129-30 (2d Cir.1994). 
164 World Series of Casino Gamb., Inc. v. King, 1986 WL 12525, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
165 In re IBM Sec. Lit., 163 F.3d 102, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
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As recently as 1991, the conventional wisdom held that the puffery defense was 
moribund and had "all but gone the way of the dodo,"166 although recent publications 
argue that it has come back to life.167  Based on this account, I expected the puffery 
doctrine would be relatively rare, and more common in the present than in the past. 
Second, courts apply the so-called "bespeaks caution" doctrine, which holds that 
fraud claims based on allegedly misleading predictions are cured by later cautionary 
statements.168 Unlike puffery, bespeaks caution relies on the presence of later warnings 
to dismiss earlier forecasts (whether specific or vague).  
In my analysis, I coded for the bespeaks caution technique when courts explicitly 
used the term, and when courts used cautionary or risk sharing statements in one part of a 
disclosure to negate the importance of other disclosures, even in the absence of the words 
"bespeaks caution."  Examples include:
• Investors in a limited partnership designed to produce income from oil and 
gas properties alleged that the brokers had told them the investment was "low" or "no"
risk; a written brochure also stated that the partnership would feature "regular cash 
distributions," "no exploration risk," and that the investments would "meet the needs of 
income-oriented investors."169 The brochure, however, incorporated a Prospectus, which 
warned that  "there is a risk that estimates of future prices or costs . . . may prove to be 
inaccurate," that the organizers had limited experience in assessing oil and gas properties, 
and that all estimates (of risk and return) in the prospectus were "to some degree 
166 LOSS & SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3434 (3d ed. 1991); 
167
 O'Hare, supra n. 160, at 1709-11 (relying on anecdotal evidence to question that account).
168
 Jennifer O'Hare, Good Faith and the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine: It's Not Just a State of Mind, 58 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 619 (1997) (discussing doctrine); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures That "Bespeak 
Caution," 49 BUS. LAW. 481 (1994).
169 Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, 735 F. Supp. 1196, 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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speculative."170  Under the bespeaks caution doctrine, any investing based on the oral or 
written representations promising low risks was "clearly unreasonable."171
• Purchasers of stock in the Donna Karan International initial public 
offering alleged fraud based (in part) on statements regarding the corporation’s beauty 
division, such as "the success of the Company’s fragrance products is evi denced by the 
continued annual sales growth of each such product since its launch."  These statements 
were made when the division was losing money and posed a significant operational 
problem for the corporation as a whole.172  However, the prospectus also bespoke 
caution: the division had "never made money," was "not expected to make money in 
1996," and was planning the "inherently risky and expensive launch of a new 
fragrance."173  The earlier statements were found by the court to be presumptively 
immaterial.
Scholars have observed that the bespeaks caution technique "enjoys wide 
acceptance among the courts"174 and is one of the three most important developments in 
securities law in the last fifteen years.175  Bespeaks caution is supposed to have originated 
in 1986.176  Based on this history, I expected the bespeaks caution doctrine to increase 
sharply in use in recent years.
A third technique is the Zero Price Change.  In rare cases, in the absence of 
market effects from a given price change, courts determine disclosures were immaterial 
170 Id. at 1201.
171 Id. at 1202.
172 In re Donna Karan Intern. Sec. Lit., No. 97-cv-2011, 1998 WL 637547, at *6-8 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 
1998).
173 Id. at * 13
174 R. Gregory Roussel, Securities Fraud or Mere Puffery: Refinement of the Corporate Puffery Defense, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1053 (1998)
175
 Langevoort, supra n. 19, at 479.
176
 Langevoort, supra n. 168, at 481.
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as a matter of law.177 Courts infer from the absence of price movement that the 
disclosure was presumptively immaterial to a reasonable investor.  Surprisingly, the 
presumption is unilateral.178 This technique is intertwined with the causation requirement 
in some securities cases (that is, plaintiffs must prove causation-in-fact; in the absence of 
market movement, plaintiffs’ presumption of causation are rebutted).179  I coded for 
application of this technique either when the court applied a market test, or when it noted 
evidence that investors did not sell their holdings in reaction to disclosure.180  Although it 
would seem the technique ought to be applied only following a price analysis which 
corrected for the effects of market movement generally, and industry effects in particular, 
courts seemed to be unconcerned with such niceties.181 Given the structure of the 
materiality analysis, I predicted that zero price change should be a rare technique, 
because the insights behind zero price change are really directed to the distinct loss 
causation issue.  
Fourth is the "trivial matters" technique, with which courts hold presumptively 
immaterial nondisclosures relating to small percentages of total sales or revenues.182  I 
coded for the application of the trivial matters technique whenever a court found that 
information was too numerically or financially unimportant to be material, including 
177 See Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 123-4.
178 Id. at 124.
179 See, e.g., Sand. Chef of Texas Inc. v. Reliance Natn'l Indem. Ins., 319 F.3d 205 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(equating cause-in-fact requirement with actual reliance on alleged fraudulent misrepresentation); Powers 
v. British Vita, P.L.C., 57 F.3d 176 (2nd Cir. 1995) (cause-in-fact of violation of securities laws is a 
prerequisite for standing to sue for a RICO violation).
180 Compare Elkind v. Ligget & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 166-7 (2d Cir. 1980) (failure of institutional 
investors to sell stock) with Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 56 F. Supp.2d 222, 227 (D. Conn. 1999) (court 
examined NYSE trading information following disclosure and found there "was no movement in the 
Citizens stock following the announcement and within days thereafter, the price of the stock increased.")
181 See, e.g. Ganino, 56 F. Supp.2d at 227; Leventhal v. Tow, 48 F. Supp.2d 104, 116 (D. Conn. 1999) 
(price increase within several days of disclosure "belies claims of a 'stunning' negative disclosure of a 
material nature").
182
 Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 125.
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evaluations of the (un)likelihood of a future event (such as a merger).  Note that while 
trivial matters may look like puffery in the case of puffery, a company’s overoptimistic 
statements of fact or optimism are deemed immaterial because the of the content of the 
words used; here, they are immaterial based on an economic conclusion about their 
relationship to the financial status of the company as a whole. Some examples follow:
• Inflation of revenues of $217 million due to "round-trip" trading of an 
energy firm represented only .3% of total revenues in the relevant time period, and, on a 
motion to dismiss was therefore "immaterial as a matter of law," despite evidence of price 
decline when the round-tripping allegations became public.183
• In a suit for failure to disclose merger negotiations in a registration 
statement issued pursuant to a debt offering, plaintiffs alleged that two large corporations 
began merger negotiations in April, 1993, had signed confidentiality agreements, and had 
agreed in principal on the ratio of shares to be exchanged and the management of a 
combined company, before the negotiations broke down.  At the time of the 
nondisclosure, the companies "remained in contact," but were not actually negotiating.  
Subsequently, the merger discussions resumed and were consummated.  The possibility 
of a merger was held to be too trivial to be material and thus triggering the need to 
disclose.  The court found that even if "one stretches the concept of preliminary 
negotiations as far as it can go, remaining in contact with someone after one has broken 
off formal negotiations does not seem to be included. Stated another way, to call this 
state of affairs material would make just about anything at all material."184
183 In re Duke Energy Corp. Sec. Lit., 282 F. Supp.2d 158, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
184 Nelson v. Paramount Comm., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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I had no expectations about the scope of this doctrine before beginning my 
analysis.
b. The Second Set of Techniques
Fifth, courts regularly describe a failure to read a prospectus as "reckless."185 I 
coded for this technique in two contexts.  First, courts sometimes contrast oral statements 
(alleged to be material) with written disclaimers, holding that the written disclaimer 
"trumped" the oral one, making it presumptively immaterial.186 Second, and more 
commonly, courts state that investors should read all parts of a given disclosure (or 
related disclosures) together, and that no one statement can be evaluated in isolation.187
This technique differs from bespeaks caution in that it applies in all circumstances where 
one part of the disclosure contradicts (or helps to contextualize) another part, and also in 
the context of tension between oral and written statements.  
I hypothesized that the failure to read technique would appear relatively 
commonly in my dataset, as courts dismissed claims by investors who alleged fraud 
based on oral misrepresentations.
Sixth, courts deny plaintiffs the ability to prove "fraud by hindsight."188 Courts 
insist that plaintiffs plead more than simply bad outcomes, but rather that they produce 
information that would have led objective parties to believe the actors had knowledge of 
185 See Carr v. CIGNA Sec., Inc., 95 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 1996).  But see Donald C. Langevoort, Selling 
Hope, Selling Risk:  Some Lessons for Law and Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated 
Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627, 682-83 (1996) ("Ready characterization of a failure to read a dense and 
detailed prospectus as "reckless" is troublesome on a number of levels.  Most obviously, there is the 
empirical problem.  It is awkward to use the term reckless to describe behavior that is quite normal and 
expected..")  The SEC appears to reject the "reckless approach" of the Carr court.  See In re Robert A. 
Foster, 51 S.E.C. 1211, 1213 (1994) ("Those who sell securities by means of representations inconsistent 
with [written disclosures] do so at their peril.")
186 See, e.g., Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, 735 F. Supp. 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
187 Ferber v. The Travelers Corp., 802 F. Supp. 698, 705-06 (D.Conn. 1992)
188
 Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 126 (fraud by hindsight goes to scienter); Gulati et al., supra n. 23, at 816-
18.
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fraud at the time of the nondisclosure.189 Therefore, pleadings that depend on an 
inference that because a bad event has occurred it was more likely all along, are said to be 
attempting to prove "fraud by hindsight."190  I coded for presence of fraud by hindsight 
even in the absence of these magic words. 191
Previous work on this doctrine found that only 2% of cases, a "handful,"
analyzing the fraud by hindsight technique involved materiality determinations.192  My 
coding was more permissive with respect to finding fraud by hindsight as a materiality 
technique,193 but I still expected the doctrine to appear relatively rarely in the dataset.
The seventh technique used in finding presumed immateriality was the so-called 
"truth on the market" doctrine.194  Courts apply the truth on the market technique to find 
presumptively immaterial disclosures which would have provided the investor with no 
information he or she could not have obtained from another publicly available source.195
For example, the Second Circuit concluded that failure to disclose a potential director's 
189
 Gulati et al., supra n. 23, at 781.
190
 Judge Friendly's treatment of this issue is paradigmatic:  Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 
1978)
191 Cf. In re Union Carbide Sec. Lit., 648 F. Supp. 1322, 1327 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (to "permit these omissions 
to constitute a securities action would allow future plaintiffs to walk into court with a 'materiality through 
hindsight' cause of action.").
192
 Gulati et al., supra n. 23, at 807-09 (noting that a first round of coding had produced a significantly 
higher numbers of cases).
193
 I generally coded for applications of a given technique based on what the court itself said it was doing 
(i.e., if a determination is made in the "materiality" section, it was a materiality determination).  If a court 
said it was making a materiality determination, while clearly making a determination about the non-
existence of a duty to disclose, my coding reflected it as a nondetermination of materiality.  Gulati, 
Rachlinski and Langevoort similarly "scrutinized" the text to attempt to discern the real reasons for a 
court's decision, and changed an initial determination of 30% to 2%.  Id. at 807.  Because of structural 
advantages embedded in the Gulati paper (experience, acumen and numbers of researchers) it is probably 
fair to assume that their "corrections" of materiality determinations are more "accurate" in some objective 
sense than mine. However, there are two points to note. First, it is relatively astonishing that the courts in 
the Gulati sample were apparently so confused about the intersection between materiality and fraud by 
hindsight.  See id. at 822-23 (explaining courts' confusion about securities doctrine and fraud by hindsight).  
Second, my sample should have contained a greater number of fraud by hindsight cases in general, because 
I coded for that doctrine whether or not it was specifically so identified.
194 Ganino, 228 F.3d at 167.
195 See generally COX AND HAZEN, supra n. 1, at 297 (discussing truth on the market doctrine).
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problems with organized labor, which might otherwise be a material omission, was
presumptively immaterial because "the difficulties were reported countrywide in the 
press and on radio and television, were discussed in Congress, and were analyzed in 
published administrative and judicial opinions."196
The Second Circuit has cautioned that the "truth-on-the-market defense is 
intensely fact-specific and is rarely an appropriate basis for dismissing a § 10(b) 
complaint for failure to plead materiality."197 I expected the technique to appear 
exceedingly rarely.
Eighth, courts routinely assume that disclosures are not misleading simply 
because they do not explain the economic, financial, and legal consequences of the 
information actually disclosed.198 In the Second Circuit at least, the "understand 
consequences" technique is best expressed by the axiom that "corporations ‘are not 
required to address their stockholders as if they were children in kindergarten.’"199
Courts presume that reasonable investors are able, in essence, to add 2 + 2: given these 
preconditions, 4 is not a material fact to be disclosed. 200  In the financial context, adding 
2 + 2 is analogous to the following types of skills, among others:201
196 Seibert v. Sperry Rand Corp., 586 F.2d 949, 952 (2d Cir. 1978) ("A party's reasonable belief that the other party 
already has access to the facts should excuse him from new disclosures which reasonably appear to be repetitive . . . 
. We agree with the district court that reasonable minds could not differ as to the immateriality of the omissions.") 
(internal citations and quotations omitted.)
197 Ganino, 228 F.3d at 167.
198
 This technique, which I identified from the caselaw, inverts the "buried facts doctrine."  Under that 
doctrine a filing may be deemed materially misleading, despite having disclosed all material information, if 
the information is not properly highlighted. See, e.g., Gould v. Am. -Haw. Steam. Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d 
Cir. 1976); Smallwood v. Pearl Brew. Co., 489 F.2d 579, 603 (5th Cir. 1974).
199 Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 554 (S.D.N.Y.1967).
200 Beaumont v. Am. Can Co., 621 F. Supp. 484, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
201
 Other examples include: 
• Understanding the idea of opportunity costs of real estate investments.  Kahn v. Wien, 842 F. Supp. 667, 
675-76 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
• Understanding the nature and scope of interest necessary for a change in corporate control. Samjens 
Partners I v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 614, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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• Understanding that if both "variable annuities and tax qualified retirement 
plans are tax deferrable," disclosing that using variable annuities for tax reasons is not 
necessary.202
• Understanding that shares may be valued using different methodologies and 
appreciating the differences based on relevant underlying facts.203
• Understanding that corporate managers are self-interested and wish to retain 
control.204
• Understanding basic accounting treatment.205
I had no expectations about this technique before analyzing the data.
My analysis also coded for "obscure" decisions (for which I could not determine 
why a finding of presumed immateriality had been made) and for an "other" category 
(where I could determine why the court had found disclosures or omissions immaterial, 
but the reason did not fit one of the eight named techniques).
Table 2 describes, for each of the technique, the total number of cases applying 
the techniques, the percentage of cases applying the technique, and the percentage of 
these cases finding any claim presumptively immaterial. 
202 Donovan v. Am. Skandia Life Ass. Corp., No 02-9859, 2003 WL 21757260, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 
2003).
203 In re United Brands Co. Sec. Lit., No. 85-5445, 1988 WL 67413, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1988).
204 Allyn Corp. v. Hartford Nat. Corp., No 81-912, 1982 WL 1301, at *24 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 1982).
205 Rubin v. Long Island Lighting Co., 576 F. Supp. 608, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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Trivial 54 16.8% 32.9%
Other 35 10.9% 21.3%
Bespeaks Caution 34 10.6% 20.7%
Truth on the 
Market
24 7.5% 14.6%
Puffery 23 7.1% 14.0%








c. Statistical Analysis of Techniques
For the five most common of the named techniques (ignoring the "other"
category) I performed two additional tests, asking: first, if the prevalence of the technique 
as a means to finding presumed immateriality changed over time; and second, if the 
techniques were positively correlated with others (i.e., were there particularly common 
pairings of techniques).
(1) Effect of Time
Figure 4 shows the effect of time on the techniques of understand consequences, 
triviality, bespeaks caution, truth on the market, and puffery.  It compares the relative use 
of these five techniques to find a disclosure presumptive immaterial:
206
 Because multiple techniques could be present in each case, some percentages will exceed 100%
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Figure 4 suggests that two techniques are growing over time (puffery and 
bespeaks caution) and two are shrinking (triviality and understand consequences) while 
one (truth on the market) has remained relatively constant.  That is, while before 1980, 
courts applied puffery in only 2% of all cases, in the last five years they did so 12.5% of 
the time.  I replicate Figure 4 in the margin in tabular form.207
As presumed immateriality as a whole is not itself changing (at least in a 
statistically significant way) over time, this effect is relative.  Puffery and bespeaks 
caution are taking "market share" from triviality and understanding consequences. But, 
207
 In the following chart, the numbers represent the percentage of total private plaintiff cases (322 total 













UC 20.4 22.2 19.6 9.3 19.6 12.5
Trivial 23.5 16.7 17.9 16.3 12.5 14.1
BC 0 0 5.4 23.3 19.6 15.6
Truth/Market 6.1 7.4 5.4 14 1.8 11
Puffery 2 1.8 1.8 11.6 12.5 12.5
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of these five common techniques, only the growth in the bespeaks caution and puffery 
doctrines is statistically significant.208
(2) Correlation Between Immateriality Techniques.
Next, I tested for the correlation between techniques.  Table 3 
displays the results of a statistical test asking the following question:  if a court uses a 
given presumed immateriality technique, are any other techniques also likely to appear 
(or not to appear).209 This is a correlation coefficient test, and, on Table 3, Y denotes 
positively correlated210 and YY denotes strongly positively correlated techniques;211 N 
denotes negatively correlated, and NN denotes strongly negatively correlated techniques.  
Table 3: Correlation between Presumed Immateriality Coefficients
BC FH TR TOM PUFF ZPC FTR UC








As Table 3 shows, the only technique correlating positively or negatively with 
other techniques is the bespeaks caution doctrine.  
208
 In a one-way analysis of variance of each variable against time.  Bespeaks caution: P<.001;  
Puffery<.05.
209 See generally BARNES, supra n. 141, at 265 (describing correlation coefficients).
210
 At a .05 level.
211
 At a .01 level.
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Courts applying the bespeaks caution doctrine to a given set of disclosures are 
also very likely to use the techniques of puffery and investors’ failure to read, and 
somewhat likely to apply the truth on the market technique.  One way to explain this data 
is that these three techniques apply to similar sorts of claims – courts seeking to dismiss 
allegations turn to the same analytical toolbox and bring out three similarly useful tools.
On the other hand, courts applying bespeaks caution are less likely to use the 
triviality and understand consequences techniques at the same time.  The negative 
correlation between bespeaks caution and the triviality and understanding consequences 
techniques, together with the growth in the bespeaks caution technique itself, supports the 
theory that bespeaks caution increasingly has replaced those doctrines in the arsenal of 
courts seeking to find a way to dismiss claims as immaterial.  
Part III: BLE and the Presumed Immateriality Techniques
As Part II demonstrated, findings of presumed immateriality have been common
and stable over the last thirty years. Since 1976, surveyed courts considering the 
materiality standard have found at least one claim per case immaterial 44% of the time, 
while those courts considering the standard in private actions dismiss claims as 
immaterial 51% of the time.  Presumed immateriality thus creates a commonly re-
occurring problem for courts: to articulate and defend theories of investor behavior that
justify dismissal of securities lawsuits.  The aggregate result of courts' attempt to solve 
this problem are surprising.
First, the materiality standard’s diverse effect on private and public plaintiffs 
suggests that materiality functions to limit securities fraud recoveries to certain kinds of 
private investors (i.e., ones that do not rely on information courts presume is immaterial). 
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Because plaintiff identity predicts the doctrine more than any other tested variable212 we 
may infer that presumed immateriality's primary role is to change the behavior of 
ordinary investors.213
Some differences in private and public success rates in securities cases may be 
explained by better "screening" of the kinds of cases the government brings,214 and better 
lawyering throughout the process.215  But for this claim to explain all of the differences I 
observed in government and civil success rates, we would have to assume that civil 
plaintiffs benefit by bringing claims that fail around half the time.  This claim, in turn 
relies on a presumption about civil lawyers’ beliefs in the "docket management"
hypothesis: a certain number of claims are cut from each complaint at each stage in 
litigation,216 and therefore a case should contain more than merely meritorious claims.217
Whether this hypothesis is plausible given the securities acts’ sanctions regime (imposed 
on frivolous claims), I found no evidence in the bar literature that civil lawyers actually 
believe they need to bring cases overstuffed with claims.218
Another variant on this screening claim is to assume that because government 
212 See infra at Part II.1.c. (regression of variables).  I have not tested for the effect of defendant size nor did 
I test for the effect of defendant form (individual, partnership or corporation). 
213
 Unless there was a claim that civil suits are significantly stronger medicine than government initiated 
actions.  The empirics of such a claim are complicated, and worth exploring in another forum.
214
 Government lawyers must acquire permission at multiple bureaucratic levels before instituting a suit, and select 
which cases to litigate based on many factors, including: (1) potential public impact; (2) precendential value; (3) 
consistency with previous litigation positions; and (4) need to set standards of generally applicable behavior.  
215 Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, Mixed Signals: Reconsidering the Political Economy of Judicial Deference 
to Administrative Agencies, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 675 (2004) (discussing the practice of judicial deference to 
agencies); Michael Herz & Neal Devins, Recent Developments in Federal Agency Focus: the Department 
of Justice: The Consequences of DOJ Control of Litigation on Agencies' Programs, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 
1345, 1346 (2000) ("DOJ's status is justified on the grounds that a single, highly talented 'law firm' will 
ensure quality representation, consistency, efficiency....").
216 See infra at text accompanying notes 222 through 226.
217
 As Krawiec & Zeiler observe, where plaintiffs intermingle a few strong claims with a number of weaker claims 
based on the same fact pattern (as in most securities fraud cases) "the marginal cost of adding an additional weak 
claim to the suit is essentially zero."  Krawiec & Zeiler, supra n. n. 5, at 87.
218 But cf. Michael D. Finnegan, Survey: Consumer Financial Services, 41 BUS. LAW. 997 (1986) 
("Tactically, overpleading is extraordinarily useful to the plaintiff in the demurrer context in California.").
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litigation is so deadly for corporations, only particularly bad actors with self-dealing 
boards allow cases to proceed to any decision on the merits.  This argument is plausible 
given that many SEC investigations are settled before filing of a complaint.  But, there 
was no statistical difference in presumed immateriality determinations based on 
procedural posture,219 so this theory lacks strong support as well .
To code for a finding of presumed immateriality, I asked if any  claim was 
presumptively immaterial.  The government’s ability to pass this extremely high bar 93% 
of the time is remarkable.  No structural explanation alone explains the enormous gap 
between government success and private plaintiff failure on the materiality issue.  Rather, 
the difference is likely due to a combination of the above factors with: (1) judicial 
deference to the SEC and the United States in their roles as securities " cops"; and (2) lack 
of deference to private plaintiffs, who are seen to be under the control of counsel (filing 
"strike suits" for easy settlements).
Second, while courts should be less likely to find claims immaterial earlier in 
lawsuits, the reverse is true, and procedure generally has no significant impact on 
presumed immateriality findings.  Neither have judges’ applications of the doctrine been 
statistically different over time, even though the personnel and ideology of the federal 
courts has allegedly shifted toward judges hostile to securities law claims.220
These results strongly suggest that something strange is going on with the 
presumed immateriality doctrine.  It cannot be, as courts assert, that presumed 
immateriality is simply a way to govern corporate activity levels (as courts assert): 221 if it 
219
 The same set of government cases is too small to separate out such plaintiffs for a distinct examination.
220 See Langevoort, supra n. 5, at 316-18; see also infra at n. 253 (analysis of appointments of judges in the 
data set).
221 See supra text accompanying note 121.
Duty To Be Rational
55
were, civil and public litigants would achieve similar successes. Nor are courts merely 
protecting investors from the perils of overdisclosure.  What is really happening?
As some have argued,222 presumed immateriality may be a docket pruning 
technique.  As we have seen, courts are pruning a relatively stable percentage of 
securities fraud cases from their dockets at every procedural stage in a lawsuit.223 In this 
model, presumed immateriality permits courts to slash 40-60% of issues from a lawsuit at 
every opportunity.224
This docket pruning hypothesis is unsatisfactory on two levels.  Most damaging is 
presumed immateriality’s stability over time.  In the last thirty years, there have been 
significant shifts in how federal courts perceive their role: mechanisms for docket 
management have become more favored, and summary judgment in particular has gained 
in legitimacy as a judicial tool.225  Moreover, private party securities suits themselves 
have cycled in political popularity, from a nadir in the early-1990s (leading to the PSLRA 
in 1995), to the highs following the collapse of Enron and the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley.  
But presumed immateriality is insensitive to time; it has neither grown nor shifted in a 
way we can attributable to factors other than chance.  This finding seriously undermines 
the explanatory power of the docket pruning hypothesis.
Even if it did not, docket pruning assumes the methods of presumed immateriality 
222 See generally Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5. 
223
 Although, in practical effect, courts are pruning at a higher rate at later procedural stages.  See supra n. 
144.
224
 In one sense, this docket pruning model is related to a model of litigation that assumes only close cases are 
brought to litigation (others being settled before suit) and therefore "the formal structure of the law [will] appear 
indeterminate to any scientific, empirical method of observing judicial decisions."  George L. Priest and Benjamin 
Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 6 (1984), cited in Krawiec & Zeiler, supra n. n. 
5, at 85-86.  I, like Krawiec and Zeiler, conclude that there is reason to doubt the predictive value of this theory in 
the context of analyzing one element in a larger claim.  Id. at 87.  
225
 See generally Martin B. Louis, Intercepting and Discouraging Doubtful Litigation, A Golden 
Anniversary View of Pleading, Summary Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions Under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1023 (1989).
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are not significant.  But, if the reasons for presumed immateriality decisions have 
undergone a noticeable shift over time, such shifting rationales would suggest a degree of 
intellectual coherence (at any given moment in time) the docket pruning model 
eschews.226 To make sense of presumed immateriality, then, we need to consider why 
courts say they are finding claims presumptively immaterial.  As discussed above, puffery
and bespeaks caution appear to be displacing understand consequences and triviality as 
the most common reasons court cite to find claims immaterial.  To determine if this 
change is consequential, we can now analyze each of these doctrines from a BLE
perspective.  
1. Puffery and Bespeaks Caution: Investor States of Mind
When disclosures or omissions are found to be immaterial based on the puffery 
doctrine, courts make an assumption about investor reaction to disclosure:  reasonable 
investors do not invest capital based on optimism, but instead based on facts.  Is this true?
No. Under many circumstances, BLE would predict the reverse.227  The puffery 
doctrine ignores the powerful effects of loss aversion; investors whose stock has lost 
value are risk seeking (and more likely to act on positive disclosures with weak 
informational content).228  Similarly, puffery ignores the perversion of rationality that 
accompanies our powerful overoptimism bias: when a corporation states that market 
conditions are "likely to improve," and we already own some of its stock, we are likely to 
think to ourselves: "of course my stock will do better than average."229  Arguing that 
226
 This is not to say that the two models are mutually exclusive.  Judges may be using presumed 
immateriality techniques to prune their dockets even as they impose a model of investor behavior.  
227
 Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 120 ("Anecdotally, it does not take much time watching investment 
programs on television to notice that even vague statements of optimism by corporate managers are 
considered important by the investment news media.")
228 See supra text accompanying notes 65 through 69.
229 See supra text accompanying notes 73 through 80.
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puffing statements will not be relied on also ignores possible endowment effects,
experiential thinking,230 information overload,231 source blindness, and herd behavior.232
Use of the bespeaks caution technique also contradicts BLE insights.  Not 
surprisingly, only rarely did courts apply  the bespeaks caution doctrine based on an 
empirical analysis of whether shareholders actually reacted to disclosures which were 
subject to cautions.233  Thus, courts’ increased use of the doctrine represents a mere
assumption that cautionary statements obviate the reasonableness of reliance by 
reasonable investors on earlier forecasts (either positive or negative). 
Not only do individuals have the problems of risk processing (discussed above 
respecting puffery), endowment, experiential thinking, and information overload, they are 
also unable to make (as courts applying the bespeaks caution doctrine require them) the 
subtle adjustment with respect to informational source.  Courts assume that individuals 
can hear a source saying two things: "I express the following beliefs about the future"; 
and "Don’t rely on anything I just said," and make a rational decision about which of 
those statements is worthy of credence.  This is nonsense.
Puffery and bespeaks caution are alike in another way: they attempt to create 
bright line rules to differentiate reasonable from unreasonable reliance.  Both doctrines 
are easy to apply (they require merely the presence or absence of certain magic words),
230
 To the extent that our assessment of risk is colored by our emotional assessment of the target, generally 
positive statements may drape the investment with a penumbra of positive feeling, leading us to discount 
later specific information to the contrary.  See supra text accompanying notes 81 through 88.
231
 For investors confronted with a large disclosure, early puffery (such as, "our business model remains 
strong") may be incorporated into the investing decision, while later financial disclosures in dense 
footnotes would be ignored. I would provide a citation from a case here, but I sense the reader might be 
overwhelmed by the detail.
232
 When puffery is in a press release or made through a corporate spokesman, it seems likely that investors 
will respond to social cues and trust the corporate manager's clear statements of vague optimism, especially 
if others in the market do so. 
233 Cf. Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 123 (criticizing courts for ignoring context when analyzing 
statements allegedly protected by the bespeaks caution doctrine).
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and easy to create from the perspective of the disclosing entity.  That is, disclosing 
entities can shelter information from fraud by making it part of optimistic predictions or 
pairing it with cautions.  Notably, both doctrines create incentives for corporations to use 
words that they hope will induce reliance, but which are legally irrelevant: they are bright 
line rules that enable fraud.
2. Understand Consequences and Triviality
Let us compare puffery and bespeaks caution with their common predecessors: 
understanding consequences and triviality.  Both of these techniques are focused on the 
nature of the disclosure (and not on magic words).  For understanding consequences, 
courts focused on the underlying facts disclosed, not the language of the offering 
document, and the relationship between those facts and either (a) the real world; or (b) a 
hypothesized skill-set investors deemed to possess.
Neither of these techniques is without flaws.  The consequences doctrine supports 
Langevoort’s view that judges in securities cases are subject to "lawyers’ biases,"234
which make them overconfident with respect to their ability to understand how the world 
"really works," complete with a sneer toward "laypeople" who do not understand the 
game.235 Empathy for investor incompetence is hard for judges who always analyze
disclosures in hindsight armed with briefs which explain financial, accounting, and legal 
234
 Langevoort, supra n. 5, at 318.
235
 I am reminded of Duncan Kennedy's criticism of legal education, in which he argued:
The final hierarchy that concerns us is the general social arrangement in which lawyers are treated 
. . . as among the elite of the nation.  Partly this is simply a reflection of the fact that many lawyers 
come from the upper middle class to start with . . . . At each level of the class system, lawyers are 
granted a measure of power altogether disproportionate to their objective merit. In their group 
activities, but  also in their individual social lives, they tend to exploit this deference and to 
accentuate it by emphasizing the arcane character of what they know and do.
DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST 
THE SYSTEM 57 (NYU 2004).
Duty To Be Rational
59
concepts in concise, readable ways.236  Moreover, courts regularly assume individuals 
will be able to rationally understand the likelihood of potential future gains, or unlikely 
future legal problems, despite humans’ inability to rationally calculate the effect of 
unlikely, but catastrophic, events. 
The triviality doctrine also contrasts with evidence from BLE.  It boils down to an 
intuition that "trivial bits of information do not play a role in the investment decisions of 
reasonable investors because they relate to a small aspect of the business."237 But, as 
BLE teaches, investors are poor at making this type of comparison.
Ultimately, the shift I have noted is a shift between a standard-based model of 
materiality and a model based on bright line rules, in which courts spend less time 
considering the actual potential effects of the disclosure, and more time applying a 
mechanistic set of rules ("If cautioned, then immaterial") to the words of the disclosure 
itself.  This is a troublesome development, for reasons discuss ed in Part IV.
3. Other Doctrines
Although the four techniques we have just discussed are the "headlines" of my 
results, it is worth thinking briefly about the relationship between the other doctrines in 
the arsenals of courts and BLE.  As we will see, each of the remaining four classic 
techniques relies on assumptions about human behavior which are sometimes, if not 
always, untrue.
a. Zero Price Change
The zero price change doctrine relies on the same assumption of market efficiency 
236
 Sometimes.  Lawyers' briefs are more likely to clearly explain a disclosure than a corporation's 10-K 
statement.
237
 Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 125.
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that permits securities claims to proceed without proof of actual reliance.238  That is, 
courts assume that markets will react to any price relevant information. 239
 This intuition is the same as that which would conclude that framing effects 
ought to have no relationship to outcomes; that saving two of six people is the same as 
killing four out of six.  Failure to react to information may be a result of BLE heuristics 
and biases, instead of anything internal to the importance of the disclosure itself. 
It may be interesting to consider zero price change in the context of the Sherlock 
Holmes story of the dog that did not bark in the nighttime.240  While Holmes concluded 
that silence is necessarily consequential, the empirics of this claim are dubious.241
Indeed, use of non-market impact to establish materiality at the time of the investing 
decision is a decision infected with hindsight bias (although such impact would be 
ameliorated if courts allowed evidence of actual market effects to mean materiality as a 
matter of law). 
Courts appear reluctant to apply the zero price change technique: in less than four 
percent of cases finding any claim presumptively immaterial did they do so.  However, 
my sense of the caselaw is that defendants make "zero price change" arguments often.  It 
is interesting, and worth further study, to think about why courts are able to resist the 
238 See Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 123-24.
239Of course, markets may be rational even when individual participants are not.  See, e.g., Hilton, supra n. 
79, at 273 (discussing political futures markets).
240
 "'Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?'
'To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.'
'The dog did nothing in the night-time.'
'That was the curious incident,' remarked Sherlock Holmes."
Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES (1901), available at 
http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/d/doyle/arthur_conan/d75me/silver.blaze.html.
241
 Intuitions about the importance of silence are common in the legal academy, especially when thinking 
about statutory interpretation.  See, e.g., Michael D. Shumsky, Severability, Inserverability, and the Rule of 
Law, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 227, 270,n.207 (2004).  I have not seen a theoretical, unified approach to 
silence (by legislatures, courts, individuals, etc.)  For the beginning of such a work, see Daniel M. Filler, 
Silence and the Racial Dimension of Megan's Law, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1535,  1576-94 (2004) (discussing 
causes and remedies for silence in discussing race with respect to community notification laws).
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conclusion that market silence should speak loudly.
b. Fraud by Hindsight
Fraud by hindsight appears to be a direct application of the doctrine of presumed 
immateriality to correct for a bias (hindsight) which results in an inappropriate finding of 
materiality.242 Only a small number of securities cases apply the doctrine (exclusively) to 
materiality rather than scienter determinations,243 although around ten percent of cases 
finding a claim immaterial cited fraud by hindsight as one of the reasons supporting their 
decision.
c. Failure to Read
Courts’ criticisms  of investors who fail to read a large universe of information, 
and who rely on oral, rather than written, materials, is understandable.  The failure to read 
doctrine serves the same ends as most formalities.244  Courts concerned about the 
prevalence of securities suits do well to insist on the primacy of written material.  Thus, 
the failure to read technique acts as a common law statute of frauds in securities cases.
The technique has grown in scope over time, but the growth is not statistically 
significant.245  Even today, courts apply the failure to read technique rarely. When they 
do so, they also commonly apply the bespeaks caution doctrine.  This correlation 
suggests a kind of "analytical toolbox" for the problem of fraud alleged to have occurred
through misleading, inconsistent disclosure. 
d. Truth on the Market
242
 Rachlinski, supra n. 53, at 108.
243 See also Gulati et al ., supra n. 23, at 807.
244 See generally Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941) (consideration, 
channeling and evidentiary functions).
245
 The results might be different in a jurisdiction like the Seventh Circuit that endorses the Carr v. Cigna
doctrine.
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The truth on the market technique imposes search costs on investors, and ignores 
evidence that more information may not improve the quality of investing decisions.  For 
courts applying this technique, the idea that an omission cannot be material if it replicates 
publicly available information makes a great deal of sense. Nevertheless, increased use 
of this technique makes investors responsible for understanding and processing a 
bewildering array of information.  Whether all investors are equally capable of making 
this kind of search and analysis is questionable.
Nonetheless, the truth on the market technique is relatively prevalent, appearing 
in 7.5% of the total dataset, and in 14.6% of cases finding any claim immaterial.  
In Table 4, I summarize the preceding discussion by connecting each of the eight 
named techniques with the BLE observations that the technique potentially ignores:




























































Representativeness Heuristic X X X X
Risk Seeking (Mitigate Current Losses) X X X X X
Risk Aversion (Gains) X X X X
Endowment Effect X X X X X
Overconfidence X X X X X X
Experiential Thinking X X X X X X X
Information Processing
Source Blindness X X X X X
Overweighing Oral Disclosures X X X X
Framing Effect X X X X











Herd Behavior X X X X X X
Percentage of Cases Finding Presumed Immateriality That Applied Technique (Average)
14 20.7 9.2 3.7 32.9 11 34.1 14.6
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In considering the implications of the results displayed in Table 4, we can see that all of 
the techniques, to one degree or another, make assumptions about behavior which are 
fundamentally in tension with how BLE predicts investors will sometimes behave.  We also see 
that puffery, for example, is a doctrine that most obviously affects individuals’ trouble with 
probabilistic assessments, while the failure to read heuristic is primarily in tension with 
individuals’ inabilities to process information rationally.  The relationship between BLE’s 
insights and courts’ blindness to how investors behave gives rise to the "duty to be a rational 
shareholder."
IV. The "Duty" to Be a Rational Shareholder
The shift in the rationale for findings of presumed immateriality over time from 
standards-based to bright-line based reasoning suggests that materiality is evolving 
toward a formal rule: behave in a certain way, or suffer the consequences.  Courts 
applying a standards-based model (represented by the trivial matters and understanding 
consequences doctrines), provide little guidance for investors to know before injury if
they were reacting to material or immaterial information.  Under the puffery and 
bespeaks caution doctrines, by contrast, all investors should be able to anticipate legal 
rules and conform their conduct accordingly.  If investors fail to comply with the bright 
line rules of the doctrine, they will not recover damages despite relying on disclosures or 
omissions that were fraudulent.
  One way to understand the federal disclosure and liability regime is as a
federally mandated and defined insurance against securities fraud,246 conditioned on a 
246 Cf. David Tabak, Loss Causation and Damages in Shareholder Class Actions: When it Takes Two Steps 
to Tango, 1442 PLI/CORP 181, 195 (2004) (protection offered by securities laws exceeding expected yields 
absent the law "makes the securities fraud laws a form of insurance").  To be clear, this is just a metaphor: 
investors do not pay a special form of premium to obtain the protection of the securities laws.  Although we 
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finding of materiality.247  This benefit is generally available to all investors in federally 
registered securities, and "pays out" if and when an investor has been harmed by fraud 
and files suit.  There are then two narratives explaining how the law distributes this 
benefit:
1. To get the benefit of securities insurance, you should invest 
rationally in response to disclosure; or
2. All investors will receive the benefit of securities insurance, unless 
they act irrationally in response to disclosure.
The second formulation, which suggests a punishment for failure to comply with a 
generally applicable standard, better captures the caselaw’s evolving emphasis on the 
undesirability of protecting irrational investors and the increased emphasis on bright-line, 
enforceable rules.  This narrative also has an important connotation: we should see 
presumed immateriality as an attempt by courts to shape the ordinary relationship 
between corporations and investors, not merely the contours of recovery in litigation.  
That is, we should see presumed immateriality as a way of creating a legal duty to be a 
rational shareholder.248
might consider federal income taxes to be a kind of premium, that argument would seem to prove too 
much.
247 William S. Feinstein, Note, Securities Fraud: Pleading Fraud with Particularity-Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 9(b) in the Rule 10b-5 Context: Koval v. M.C.I. Communications Corp., 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
851, 855 n.32 (1996) (securities fraud is not a form of insurance because of materiality limitations, among 
others).  To state that securities fraud recovery provides a form of insurance to investors is not to claim that 
the insurance is the same as, say, as car insurance.  However, all insurance excludes certain kinds of 
injuries (i.e. drunk driving) and privileges certain behaviors (i.e., a certain number of accident free years) or 
demographics (i.e., insurance is more expensive the very young and very old).  See generally Robert H. 
Jerry II & Kyle Mansfield, Justifying Unisex Insurance, Another Perspective, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 329 (1985) 
("Insurers will continue to classify insured persons into distinct groups as long as the cost of measuring the 
differentiating factor is less than the premium reduction the insurer can offer the members of a 
differentiated, better-risk group. ...").
248
 Some will object that it is never appropriate to refer to a defense in litigation – a bar to liability or damages – as a 
legal "duty."  Such skepticism toward "duty talk" is prominent in analogous defenses like the "duty to mitigate" 
contract and tort damages, the "duty to preserve evidence," and the duty to be non-negligent (in comparative 
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Presumed immateriality judges investor behavior before injury (that is, change in 
share price) has occurred: every individual buying stock risks losing the benefit of 
securities insurance if she is not "rational."249  As a result, the presumed immateriality 
affects all investors in the capital markets.  It conditions the availability of a legal benefit 
on compliance with a generally applicable standard of conduct, imposing on shareholders 
onerous affirmative – and conduct shaping – expectations.250
It is worth reiterating why judges seem drawn to rationality as a way to choose 
between reasonable and unreasonable investors.  As alluded to earlier in this paper, there 
are three competing theories that explain the evolution of materiality in the securities law.  
The first two are essentially based on BLE insights, and the third is ideological:
• First, judges may be using these techniques as a quick and easy way (a 
cognitively limited way) to get rid of (boring) cases that they do not 
particularly want to spend time on.251 We can think of this as the "lazy 
judges" hypothesis.
negligence states). See, e.g., Howard C. Eglit, Damages Mitigation Doctrine in the Statutory Anti-Discrimination 
Context: Mitigating Its Negative Impact, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 9, n.3 (2000) ("failure to mitigate does not expose the 
failing party to any liability, as would the failure to satisfy a duty"); Roy Ryden Anderson, Incidental and 
Consequential Damages, 7 J.L. & COM. 327, 376 (1987) ("duty to mitigate is a "misnomer, because the aggrieved 
party incurs no actual liability for his failure to mitigate"); Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of 
Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1184 (1970) (criticizing application of the term "duty" to the duty to mitigate 
contract damages).  Even though these duties may give rise to important affirmative obligations they arise after the 
cause of action has accrued.  Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General 
Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 974 (1983).  Similarly, the duty to preserve evidence at trial 
arises after a party has notice of the possibility of a suit. See Townsend v. Am. Insul. Panel Co., 174 F.R.D. 1, 13-14 
(D. Mass. 1997).
249
 In this way, it is distinct from "false duties" like the duty to mitigate.  See id.
250 For those who have difficulty imagining how impairment of rights in litigation may be conceived as 
duty at all, my colleague, Craig Green, suggests that we imagine that the Federal Government has created a 
program that distributes benefits to foster parents.  The Government imposes certain conditions on the 
receipt of funds (i.e., keeping the home in a certain condition, maintaining a stable home, making the home 
available for inspection); failure to observe the conditions will lead to a denial of funds.  It seems relatively 
uncontroversial to imagine these conditions as "duties" imposed by the federal government on foster 
parents.  However, they are likely to be enforced only when a foster parent is denied the benefits, and sues, 
at which time the government will assert that the parent has failed his duty, and is not entitled to benefits.
251 See Bainbridge and Gulati, supra n. 5, at 111-13.
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• Second, judges may be presuming immateriality because they are subject 
to "lawyer’s biases" that render them overconfident in their abilities to 
themselves avoid the biases affecting investors.252 We can think of this as 
an "arrogant judges" hypothesis.
• Third, judges may be reflecting and encouraging a general "pro-
defendant" bias resulting from a shift in the personnel on the federal 
courts.253 We can think of this final theory as the "conservative judges" 
hypothesis.
The evidence I collected does not support the "conservative" hypothesis, as
presumed immateriality has not grown noticeably in scope over time, nor has it shifted 
with changes in the securities laws.254 My evidence also undermines both behavioral 
explanations.  The "lazy" and "arrogant" stories of judicial behavior fail to account for the 
shift from standards-based to bright-line rules of decision.
I therefore offer a fourth explanation for the presumed immateriality doctrine: 
courts analyze investors’ claims of reasonableness based on a model of behavior they 
import from their experiences with corporate law.  For courts, public shareholders ought 
to act like all other participants in the corporate governance system: motivated by an 
easily comprehendible set of monetary incentives, and subject to a clear set of bright lines
252
 Langevoort, supra n. 5, at 314-16.
253 Id. at 316-18.  While that trend my be apparent nationwide, the composition of the judges of the Second Circuit 
and its district courts has remained relatively stable.  In 1976, of 66 judges sitting on the courts that made up my 
sample, 39 (or 59%) were appointed by Republican Presidents.  In 2004, of 110 judges, 63 (or 57%) were appointed 
by Republican Presidents.  See Federal Judicial Center, Search Engine, available at
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf (last visited Feb. 22, 2005).
254
 Another perspective on the stability of the doctrine would begin by positing that cases filed have actually gotten 
stronger (or, better pled) over time, and that, therefore, the lack of change in findings of presumed immateriality 
does reflect a negative change in judicial ideology.  This claim would probably turn on an analysis of the effects of 
the PSLRA on pleading practice post-1995 (i.e., with law firm consolidation post-1995, pleadings got better), and 
would not explain stability before that date.  It is difficult, in reading the caselaw, to develop a way to measure the 
objective strength of a lawsuit apart from its court ordered disposition.  See also supra n. 137 (discussing a variant 
on the "strength of lawsuit" hypothesis).
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to ensure the smooth functioning of the corporate form. 255 Indeed, rational public 
shareholders are the foundation of the corporate governance system: take them away, and 
the entire edifice may crumble.  As judges have become more aware of human 
irrationality – through increased awareness of BLE and increased publicity about 
challenges to the efficient capital market hypothesis – perhaps they have reacted strongly 
to protect the model of human rationality.  Thus, courts are comfortable imposing a duty 
to be rational, thereby requiring investors in the securities context to behave like other
actors in the corporate governance model.
But, in doing so courts put the securities laws in tension with the fundamental 
principle of corporate governance introducing this paper: shareholders owe no duties.  
That is, courts seeking to harmonize securities and corporate law may have put the two 
systems in conflict with each other. Which will give?  
Before engaging in what might become a very large thought project, we should 
consider how we might measure the actual, real world effects of the duty that this article 
has uncovered.  
1. The Duty to Be Rational: Some Empirical Predictions
255
 Corporate law generally assumes and provides incentives for shareholder profit maximizing behavior.  
Greenfield, supra n. 2, at 646-6 (noting examples).  
The ultimatum game, a well-known BLE experiment, provides a different perspective on this result.  An 
experiment provides one of two people (the "chooser") a pot of money.  The chooser must decide on an 
allocation between himself and another individual (the "accepting party").  The chooser may describe any 
allocation he wishes; the accepting party may only accept or refuse the bargain.  In the absence of 
acceptance, neither party takes any money. See generally Greenfield and Kostand, supra n. 38, at 988-92 
(discussing variants of the ultimatum game and its application in legal scholarship).  Economic theory 
predicts the accepting party will accept any non-zero proposal.  However, it is quite common for the 
accepting party to reject offers of less than twenty percent of the total available.  And, surprisingly, the 
choosing party usually offers between forty and fifty percent of the total. 
In a related experimental series, BLE practitioners analyzed individuals' reactions to corporate cost benefit 
analysis ("CBA").  In CBA, corporations decide between alternatives by applying the profit maximization 
norm to the costs and benefits of action and inaction. A robust body of literature suggests that individuals 
dislike CBA, especially when the decision involves possible loss of human life.  This result holds even 
when experimental subjects understand the benefits of efficiency and profit maximization. See generally
David A. Hoffman, Review Essay, How Relevant is Jury Rationality? 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 507, 524-25.
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Usually, enforcement of duties depends on the understanding that "ought implies 
can."256 But, it is very hard for individual shareholders to react rationally in response to 
information.  Many of the deviations from the model of rationality endorsed by the duty 
are unconscious products of the ways our brain is wired to make decisions.257  Individuals 
can no more control the way they react to risk, the argument would go, than they can stop 
themselves from hiccupping, from feeling an adrenaline rush in face of danger, or from 
feeling love for a child.  
It is because irrationality is somewhat fixed that the effects of this duty I would 
otherwise describe – that it has a positive effect on real world behavior – must fail.  Even 
though the duty to be rational is increasingly specific and publicized, it would be very 
surprising if in the years post-TSC Industries there was less real-world price movement in 
reaction to disclosures that the law excludes as nonactionable.  Such a correlation would 
be evidence that the duty was effective, and that individuals had been able to somehow 
modify their behaviors so as to regain the protection of securities insurance.  
Some – relying on the understanding consequences technique – would conclude 
that while full rationality (i.e. risk processing rationality) is unlikely, investors are
generally intelligent and able to process the idea of the rationality duty.  Picture a 
somewhat ambitious investor, conscious of her limitations, but intelligent enough to want 
to do something about them.  The best solution for her is to invest in mutual funds.  
Mutual funds and other institutional investors are probably less likely to behave 
irrationally in response to disclosure, are more likely to have lawyers and economists on 
256
 John Hasnas, Equal Opportunity, Affirmative Action, and the Anti-Discrimination Principle: The Full 
Philosophical Basis for the Legal Prohibition of Discrimination, 71 FORD. L. REV. 423, 506 (2002) (citing
IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 307-08 (J.M.D. Meiklejohn trans., 1990) (1787)). 
257 See supra text accompanying notes 48 through 50.
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staff to understand "prospectus-speak," will know and have recorded all price relevant 
market information, and will be less likely to be swayed into following herds into 
investments.258 Approximately 1/3 of holdings in the U.S. stock market today are 
institutional (having grown from a quarter thirty years ago).259 Informed investors should 
join this tide and commit themselves to a course of rationality before making a potentially 
harmful decision.260
Thus, as investors learn of the duties imposed by presumed immateriality 
doctrine, I predict that mutual funds should experience higher than expected capital 
infusions.  This will be especially true in years after particularly important growths in one 
of the duty’s constituent techniques (for example, the bespeaks caution doctrine’s arrival 
in the mid-1980s).
Coincident with the effects of presumed immateriality on shareholders, we should 
also see effects on corporations.  As businesses realize the protections which the doctrine 
offers them, they should feel more secure in making certain kinds of disclosures.  Thus, I 
predict that corporations should increasingly seek to shelter disclosure by coupling 
financial predictions with cautionary statements and encouraging investment by making 
proportionately more statements of corporate optimism.
Now, we must complicate the analysis which had previously assumed that all 
investors are alike. Some BLE researchers seek to demonstrate how "rationality" is a 
cultural construction that is more likely to appeal to white men than other demographic 
258Institutional investors have "extensive trading expertise" and "actively seek information about new issues 
as well as current holdings." See Ryan, supra n. 26, at 149.
259 Id. at 147.
260
 We may analogize these kind of decisions to a driver who, knowing that he is particularly likely to make 
foolish turns at intersections, proceeds to rip the steering wheel from his car when he sees the intersection 
approaching, and throws it out the window, and thereby committing himself to a straight course.  The most 
significant problem with such decision making is the presence of other committed drivers.
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groups.  This literature is complex, and I can only offer a small taste of it here.261 Some 
BLE researchers have attempted to document the ways in which sex, culture, and race 
affect reactions to risk, uncertainty, and information.  One basic and well-established
conclusion is that men and women perceive risk differently.262  Many studies have found 
that on average, men are more comfortable with higher levels of risk (particularly 
environmental risks) than women.263 Women thus exhibit higher rates of loss-aversion 
than men in evaluating financial investments.264  Some have argued that this effect results 
from women’s relative lack of socioeconomic power,265 others attribute differences to 
biology.266
Class and race also play significantly into perceptions of risk.267  In the literature, 
this is known as the "white male effect."268  As a group, white men are significantly less 
likely to be concerned about higher levels of risk (even with respect to presently held 
gains), and tolerate higher losses than minorities.269  This effect too is said to be related to 
feelings of vulnerability and disempowerment: "because [minorities] benefit less from 
many of [the world's] technologies and institutions, and because they have less power and 
261 See generally Paul Slovic et al., Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics and Science: Surveying the Risk-
Assessment Battlefield, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 390-412 (Paul Slovic ed., 2000).
262 See generally Jan L. Hitchcock, Gender Differences in Risk Perception: Broadening the Contexts, 12 
RISK: HEALTH SAFETY & ENV'T 179, 182-190 (2001) (summarizing multiple studies).
263 Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk-Assessment Battlefield, 19 
RISK ANALYSIS 689, 692 (1999) ( "Several dozen studies have documented the finding that men tend to 
judge risks as smaller and less problematic than do women.").
264 See Renate Schubert et al., Financial Decision Making: Are Women Really More Risk Averse?, 89 AM. 
ECON. REV. 381 (1999).
265
 Slovic, supra n. 263, at 692.
266
 Hitchcock, supra n. 262, at 195-8 (discussing development research).
267 See generally Melissa L. Finucane et al., Gender, Race, and Perceived Risk: The 'White Male' Effect, 2 
HEALTH, RISK & SOC'Y 159, 159 (2000) (noting that relationship between race and risk perception is 
complex and disclaiming causal connection).
268 See id; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Book Review, The Perceptions of Risk, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119, 
1157-60 (2000) (discussing and critiquing data supporting effect).
269 See Kathy Bunting, Risk Assessment and Environmental Justice: A Critique of the Current Legal 
Framework and Suggestions for the Future, 3 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J 129, 139-40 (1995) (discussing data).
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control over what happens in their communities and their lives." 270
This discussion leads to a final prediction: shares  of recoveries in securities class 
actions (and settlements) will be distinct from the demographic characteristics of the all
participants in the capital markets.271  Women and minorities will recover at lower rates 
than institutional investors, especially to the extent that materiality moves toward 
doctrines that particularly disfavor experiential thinking.272
2. The Duty to Be A Rational Shareholder: Some Corporate Law 
Complications
The discussion so far has sought to provide metrics with which to evaluate the 
practical effects of changes in judge-made securities doctrines on participants in the 
capital markets.  However, this doctrinal evolution should also cause corporate law 
scholars to explore whether some well-accepted truths about corporate governance are
ripe for reevaluation. The following section begins this task by considering the irony that 
presumed immateriality doctrine effectively increases government regulation of the 
corporate form to serve a model of investor behavior (market-based, wealth-maximizing, 
270 James Flynn et al., Gender, Race, and Perception of Environmental Health Risks, 14 RISK ANAL. 1101, 
1107 (1994); see also Bunting, supra n. 269, at 141.
271
 Studies of class action settlement practice in other contexts suggest this result.  See, e.g., Gail Hillebrand 
& Daniel Torrence, Claims Procedures in Large Consumer Class Actions and Equitable Distribution of 
Benefits, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 747, 760-61 (1988) (lower income and less educated claimants recover 
at disproportionately low rates). 
272
 The problem with this prediction is that it will be difficult to separate out the "rationality effect" from 
the general trend of increasing participation of institutional investors in securities fraud cases. See Jeffrey 
Mamorsky, Empty Nest Eggs; Directors Get the Blame for Bankrupt Pension Plans, D AND O ADVISOR
September 4, 2004.  Dan Markel, a reader of this paper in draft, suggests that women and minorities may be 
likely to participate in mutual funds at higher rates than white men, and that the demographic consequences 
I discuss in the text above may be overdrawn.  However, there is evidence that investors in mutual funds 
are "older, wealthier, and better educated then the average American," and also more likely to be men than 
women. Gordon J. Alexander, Jonathan D. Jones and Peter J. Nigro, Mutual Funds Shareholders: 
Characteristics, Investor Knowledge, and Sources of Information, 7 Fin. Serv. Rev. 301, 315 (1998) 
(analyzying demographic characteristics of participants in mutual funds), available at
http://www.rmi.gsu.edu/FSR/abstracts/Vol_07/ Volume%207%20Number%204/V7-4%20A6.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2005).
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rationality) that supposedly supports the edifice of privately ordered corporate law in the 
first instance.
I began this article by emphasizing that a basic principle of corporate law is that 
investors buy assets under a "no duty" default rule.  This rule has three bases, the first 
grounded in the basic framework of corporate law, the second in an intuition about the 
relationship between law and markets, and the third based on enforcement concerns.  
Understanding that the presumed immateriality standard has created a duty affecting all 
investors requires us to think about how courts are undermining or changing each of these 
foundational assumptions.
First, the law presumes investors are passive, delegating their control rights to the 
board and management of the asset they are purchasing.273
Second, the law presumes that the best way to encourage economic growth is to 
encourage market transactions in assets.  Encumbering assets with duties may reduce the 
value of such assets, discouraging transactions, and thus reducing the ability of markets 
to generate capital for participating businesses.274
Third, the law imposes no duties on common investors because it is difficult to 
imagine to whom such duties should run.  Courts, regulating the corporate form, 
generally reject the idea of (public) duties owed to individuals in society at large with 
(merely) potential reliance interests.
The scope of presumed immateriality requires us to reconsider whether courts in 
the securities context are adhering to these assumptions.  In particular, courts seem to be 
increasingly willing to apply a "public duty" to participants in the corporate enterprise.
273 See generally COX & HAZEN, supra n. 1, at §  2.04  (Separation of Corporate Ownership from Control).
274
 Dalley, supra n. 1, at 221-222 (discussing effects of fiduciary duties on controlling shareholders).
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In our legal system, creating duties usually entails creating correlative rights.275
However, in some circumstances, new duties (such as the duty not to harm endangered 
species) do not give rise to a right to a cause of action.276  We can conceptualize such 
duties as essentially self-regarding, and enforceable, if at all, by society at large.277
Another way to think about this problem was suggested by John Austin, who thought of 
duties as correlative not to rights, but to commands: 
Being liable to evil from you if I comply not with a wish which you 
signify, I am bound or obliged by your commands, or I lie under a duty to 
obey it.  If, in spite of that evil in prospect, I comply not with the wish 
which you signify, I am said to disobey your command, or to violate the 
duty which it imposes.278
Thus, we can think of the "duty to be a rational shareholder" as an obligation 
enforced by the "evil" of a loss of the benefit of securities insurance. It is an obligation 
which benefits society (or the market, or the corporation) but which runs to no one.
 Thus, while ordinarily breach of a duty in the corporate context creates a right to 
sue,279 the duty to be a rational shareholder creates merely a "right" to a defense in a 
given securities litigation.  In this way, presumed immateriality moves corporate law 
towards a regime that embraces the idea of public solutions for market failures, instead of 
solutions anchored in the private sector.  It supports (in a way) an expanded regime of 
government power and regulation, and reduced enforcement through private parties.
275 WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL 
REASONING 36 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919) (discussion of jural relationships); cf. Richard A. Epstein, 
In Defense of the "Old" Public Health, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1421, 1469 (2004) ("The economic principles of 
scarcity have as their legal offshoot the principle of correlative rights and duties. No new rights can be 
created unless new duties are imposed.")
276
 Earl Duke, Note, Giving Species the Benefit of the Doubt, 83 B.U. L. REV. 209, 230-33 (2003) 
(discussing limitation of principle that duties confer rights).
277 J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 120  (1997).
278 JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF THE STUDY OF 
JURISPRUDENCE 14 (Weidenfeld & Nicholson Ed., repub. 1998).
279 See generally DOBBS, supra n. 11 , §§  314-315 (The General Rules of Non-Action), 316-321 (General 
Duties to Act Affirmatively).
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And so what?  This question deserves further thought and study.  But it seems to 
me that if we are to take seriously the idea of privileging investor rationality, then it is 
just as easy to picture a regime where we affirmatively punish investors that exhibit 
especially egregious "irrational" behaviors.  (Such as prohibiting day traders from buying 
or selling stock.)  If such proposals are too draconian for our tastes, why do we accept 
presumed immateriality which creates substantially similar economic effects?  
Once we realize that the duty to be rational is an ideological choice based on 
courts’ model of corporate governance, we should also question if this model is a good fit 
for the special purposes and goals of securities law.  That is, is the duty to be rational a 
natural outgrowth of the 1933 or 1934 securities acts, which seek to protect functioning 
(and presumably efficient) markets?  Perhaps so, but it is hard to square reduced civil 
enforcement with an evolving congressional policy to increase access by individual 
investors to the capital markets.  
These questions about the nature of the duty, and the source of the right, suggest
only some of the difficulties posed by courts’ creation of new shareholder obligations. 
That courts are so willing to dismiss so many claims based on an failure to behave 
rationally is troubling; that courts have not made the duty clear is worse.
V. Conclusion
The materiality standard’s development as a proxy for economic rationality 
parallels related movements in areas of the law less commonly associated with wealth 
creation.  The issue in some parts of private law adjudication (particularly, in common-
law torts) is wheth er to allow juries to substitute their ideas of reasonableness and 
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retribution for what scholars believe should determine reasonableness, i.e., efficiency.280
In evaluating procedural reforms, some argue we should transfer the jury's role to
bureaucrats, able to rationally assess societal risks and benefits.281
Inevitably, such paternalistic solutions appear an attractive remedy to the 
malleability and incoherence of human decisionmaking.  Indeed, as observed earlier in 
this paper, many have suggested that BLE appears to foster proposals which remove 
power from citizens, to delegitimate decisions which are not related to rational ends.  
BLE appears to be evolving into a technocratic legal discipline.
The doctrine of presumed immateriality provides an opportunity to reflect on this 
trend.  Courts, ignoring BLE insights, are nonetheless doing precisely what some BLE 
scholars would have them do: deferring reflexively to the government (when it sues), and 
thus empowering government regulators.  At the same time, by shifting from a legal 
regime that focuses on the specific facts of each corporation’s financial state to the mere 
language contained in the disclosure, courts help wealthy defendants at the expense of 
"less rational," and often poorer plaintiffs.  And, as I have explored, the duty to be a 
rational shareholder may create demographic and redistributive effects that courts have 
not contemplated.  Finally, presumed immateriality appears to permit corporations to 
intentionally make disclosures they hope and expect will engender detrimental reliance 
while avoiding the consequences the securities laws intended to impose.  Thus, current 
doctrine should satisfy no one.
And, there is a possibility that presumed immateriality will have increased 
consequences in the near future. Recent proposals would "privatize" social security by 
280 See generally Kaimipono David Wenger and David A. Hoffman, Nullificatory Juries, 2003 Wisc. L. 
Rev. 1115, 1122-28.
281 SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra n. 52, at 242, 245-48.
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creating individual retirement accounts.282 Under proposals that truly create individual 
accounts, presumed immateriality might, because it undermines securities insurance for 
irrational investors (that is, most of us, most of the time), endanger the retirement funds 
of millions of Americans.283
What, then, to do?  Some have argued that courts ought to equate materiality with 
market effects: when stock prices react to disclosures, we should presume that the 
disclosure was material to a reasonable investor.284  Such proposals would make it 
substantially more difficult for courts to impose any given ideology.285 It might also
create proper incentives for corporations to present information in as clear a way as 
possible. However, the market-materiality proposal appears to assume that Congress 
intended the securities laws to be a form of insurance, as I have proposed, and not a 
mechanism to protect the market itself, as many believe.286 Market-materiality, 
moreover, could result in politically controversial suits proceeding further in litigation 
than current doctrine permits.  In short, if this is the solution to the problems this article 
has uncovered, it may be a utopian one.
282
 President Bush's Social Security Reform Proposal, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/social-security/ (accessed Feb. 12, 2005).
283
 That courts are deferring to the SEC, thus increasing its power, would seem to be reassuring.  And, needless to 
say, Congress or the SEC may remedy problems created by the duty to be rational by appropriate legislation or 
regulation.
284
 Langevoort, supra n. 64, at 157.
285
 A good objection to this proposal is to wonder why juries will do better than judges at evaluating 
investor behavior in ways that are not in tension with BLE.  I offer three responses.  First, juries, unlike 
judges, can evaluate materiality along a spectrum, because their ability to compromise on damages allows 
them to calibrate their findings of materiality to their determinations of injury.  Second, because juries need 
not explain their decision making, they may be less likely to "rationalize" materiality (i.e., forcing judges to 
discuss what materiality means makes them more likely to find disclosures immaterial).  Third, juries are 
not subject to the problem of docket management, and are instead one-off decision makers for whom the 
institutional pressures of time and appellate review are missing.  But cf. Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 
MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1426 n.16 (2004) (noting that juries' "one-off" membership renders them "immune 
from the carrots and sticks" approach which legal policymakers generally use to prevent bad decisions.)
286 See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Future of the Mandatory Disclosure 
System, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 229, 233-34 (2003) ("The goal of the mandatory disclosure regime of the federal 
securities laws is to promote capital market integrity and the efficient allocation of capital by ensuring that 
investors have the information they need to make informed investment decisions.")
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Fixing the doctrine is only a small part in the larger story, which relates to how 
courts ought to rethink their traditional approaches to the construct of the "reasonable 
person."  In the past, courts used three basic methods to evaluate reasonableness: (1) 
divine a standard from first principles or previously existing operative law; (2) leave the 
decision of reasonableness to a jury; or (3) intuit reasonableness using the judge’s own 
experience a guide.  This problem arose in many different areas of law, from traditional 
first-year subjects like contracts, torts and criminal law, 287 to regulatory topics like false 
advertising and employment discrimination.  This paper has shown that – at least in the 
securities context – courts have used reasonableness as a proxy for a normative, behavior 
shaping, rationality standard.  Empirical analysis of courts' treatment of reasonableness in
other areas of law might result in similarly interesting results.
Whether certain behaviors are or are not ordinary and reasonable need not be 
resolved by informed judicial hunches.  Courts have a fourth option: use of  experimental 
evidence of human behavior to help guide the relevant decision makers to a better 
understanding of how individuals actually act.  This option is to be preferred.  
Application of BLE should lead courts to a significantly more cautious approach toward 
presumed immateriality, or, at the very least, to more transparency about their ideological 
goals and the relationship between those goals and the purposes of the securities laws.  
287 See, e.g.,  Ypsilanti v. General Motors, 201 Mich. App. 128 (1993) (considering if manufacturer's promises of 
continued employment in exchange for tax abatements were the kind of statements a reasonable person would rely 
on).
